Buffalo Human Rights Law Review
Volume 26

Article 6

1-1-2020

Ideological Exclusion of Foreigners in Israel and in the United
States
Yuval Livnal
Buchmann Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bhrlr
Part of the Human Rights Law Commons, and the Immigration Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Yuval Livnal, Ideological Exclusion of Foreigners in Israel and in the United States, 26 Buff. Hum. Rts. L.
Rev. 81 (2020).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/bhrlr/vol26/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Human Rights Law Review by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION OF FOREIGNERS IN
ISRAEL AND IN THE UNITED STATES
Yuval Livnatt

ABSTRACT

This article explores the challenge which free speech poses to Israeli
immigrationpolicy. It does so, first, by looking into the American immigration policy regarding ideological exclusions, i.e. refusing entry of a foreigner to the U.S., or the deportation of one from it, solely due to the
foreigner'sideological belief As discussed in this article, the U.S. Supreme
Court has been consistently reluctant to strike down laws and regulations
barring entry of foreigners due to their ideological convictions, from the
beginning of the previous century, throughout the Cold-War era, and up
until the recent upholding of PresidentTrump's travel ban. The article then
turns to suggest that this doctrine of ideological exclusion is evolving in
Israeli immigrationpolicy and law too, and discusses the possible lessons
that Israel could learnfrom the American experience in the field. Three

Israeli case studies from the last decade are presented and analyzed: the
deportationof a Messianic Jew; the Israeli-PalestinianBereaved Families
for Peace conference; and a recent amendment of the Entry into IsraelLaw
allowing for the exclusion of activists who support boycotting Israel or its
settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories. The analysis of the

aforementioned cases is conducted along two axes. One is the location of
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Adam Shinar, Thomas Spijkerboer and the participants of the migration and diversity
colloquium at WZB Berlin Social Science Center for reading previous drafts of this
article and offering their insightful comments. I would also like to thank attorney
Aharon Pollak, attorney Michael Sfard, attorney Shachar Ben Meir and attorney Yotam
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the foreigner, which leads to the suggestion thatforeignersalready inside

the country are independently entitled to the protection of freedom of
speech prescribed by internationalhuman rights law and by Israeli Constitutional Law, yet are not necessarily entitled to extend their visa just by
invoking their right to free speech. The second axis is the Israeli citizens'
and citizenry's right to freedom of speech, which encompasses the right to
listen, obtain information and engage in dialogue (with a foreigner). This
analysis leads to the conclusion that although foreigners do not have a
right to enter Israel based on their own right to freedom of speech, the
citizenry has a right that the state will not prevent the admissionofforeigners solely for their ideological belief
INTRODUCTION

A traditional view - explicitly pronounced in Anglo-American legal
precedents from the late nineteenth century,1 is that a state is permitted to
exclude foreigners, for any reason whatsoever, either by not allowing them
to enter its territory to begin with or by deporting them upon entry. Let's
call this traditional principle "the state's exclusion prerogative" (hereinafter,
SEP). A further traditional understanding is that SEP emanates from sovereignty. Just as a sovereign state, by virtue of its sovereignty, is entitled to
resist foreign armies from invading its territory, so - holds the traditional
view - it is entitled to keep out citizens of foreign states.2 Hence, SEP is
perceived as extra-constitutional, in a sense that a state may invoke it
whether or not it is explicitly acknowledged by its constitution.'
Even though this traditional view of SEP is generally held by most
national courts, international bodies and legal scholars, 4 its rationale seems
not to be sharpened enough.' Its outlines are not entirely clear, and its absolutism has been increasingly eroded throughout the end of the twentieth

1. See, e.g., Musgrove v. Chan Teeong Toy, 1891 A.C. 272 (1891) (in the U.K);
Chae Chang Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (The Chinese Exclusion Case,
in the U.S). For a similar view in Israel, see HCJ 582/71 Clark v. Minister of Interior,

27(1) PD 113, 116-18 (1972).
2. GERALD L. NEUMAN,

STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS,

DERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW

BOR-

(1996) 83.

3. Louis Henkin, The Constitutionaland United States Sovereignty: A Century of

Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 857 (1987).
4. For a legal scholar challenging the cornerstones of this view, see James A. R.
Nafziger, The GeneralAdmission of Aliens under InternationalLaw, 77 AM. J. INT'L L.

804 (1983).
5. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and
Human Rights, Et Cetra, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1999).
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century, and the beginning of the current one. 6 Nowadays, courts and scholars alike normally refrain from labeling SEP as an unqualified state power
and will generally add a bracketed "almost" before this label. They might
talk of a "broad" (even "very broad") discretion of the Executive in matters
of immigration, but will stop short of the "absolute." Moreover, an understanding has emerged, the fact that SEP is extra-constitutional does not entail that it is immune from constitutional constraints, or judicial review.7
The current legal perception is that domestic (constitutional) law, as well as
international law can circumscribe the principle of sovereignty, and consequently of SEP. National courts can (and regularly do) review decisions not
to allow foreigners in, and - more so - to refrain from their deportation,
based on an array of legal norms.
In this article I will focus on a particular kind of encroachment on
SEP, one which emanates from the right to freedom of speech. Moreover,
while I will explore both the foreigner's and the citizen's right to freedom
of speech - and the way in which their correlative and corresponding
rights might, at times, influence the foreigner's right to enter a foreign
country or to continue staying in it - my attention would be mainly on the
citizen's, rather than the foreigner's right. In other words, while not overlooking the foreigner's own right to free speech (or - at times - lack
thereof, as discussed below), I will focus on the citizen's (or the citizenry's)
right to listen to and exchange ideas with a foreign national in the citizen's
own country, as part of the citizen's right to freedom of speech, and a
state's correlative duty to admit the foreigner into its territory or not to
deport her, as part of its duty to protect its citizens' constitutional rights,
who might wish to converse.
While the notion of ideological exclusion of foreigners has been
straightforwardly practiced in the United States for decades, with its peak
during the Cold War period, when Congress passed the McCarran-Walter
Act, 8 it took Israel longer to employ a similar measure by an act of the
Knesset. Only in 2017 did the Israeli Knesset amend the law to enable the
exclusion of foreigners, who call for the boycott of Israel (this amendment
will be discussed in detail in Part III(C) below). However, as I will show in
this article, anecdotal violations of the freedom of speech of foreigners took

6. NEumAN, supra note 2, at 121. See also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695
(2001); State of Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (2017) (United states case law);
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1152(a)(1) (banning discrimination in the
issuance of immigrant visas on a variety of grounds).
7. Henkin, supra note 3, at 858.

8. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1982)).
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place in Israel before 2017 as well. In most of these cases, however, Israeli
courts failed to realize the collateral effect of such violations on the freedom of speech of Israeli citizens, and furthermore, failed to rule that SEP
should be restricted in order to prevent such collateral effect.
This disregard is surprising, since the idea that a constitutional right of
a citizen could result in a curtailment of SEP is well recognized in Israel in
other contexts, such as bi-national partnerships and marriages. The Supreme
Court of Israel ruled that the constitutional right to family life derives from
the right to human dignity (which, in turn, is enumerated in Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty). 9 It further ruled that an Israeli citizen is, in
principle, entitled to exercise that right with his or her foreign partner in
Israel.10 To that end, the Court has repeatedly ruled, the Ministry of Interior
must admit the foreign partner into the country, and refrain from deporting
him or her as long as the relationship with the Israeli citizen sincerely remains, absent overriding serious concerns, e.g. threat to public safety."
The notion that a foreigner may gain a permit to enter and sojourn in
Israel by "piggybacking" on an Israeli citizen's constitutional right is, therefore, well familiar to Israeli jurists and courts. A similar analysis, I argue,
applies when freedom of speech (rather than the right to family life) is at
stake.1 2 As a matter of fact, the Israeli Supreme Court has recognized such a

possibility some decade and a half ago, in the matter of Levy v. Managerof
Industry and Services Departmentfor Foreign Workers' Permits.13 Unfor-

tunately, however, the Court's reference to the possibility that a foreigner
9. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Centrefor Arab Minority Rights in Israeland other
v. Minister of Interiorand others, 61(2) PD 202 (2006)(for English translation: http://

elyon1.court.gov.il/Files_ENG%5C03%5C520%5C070%5Ca47/03070520.a47.htm).
10. Id. majority opinion of Judges Barak, Beinisch, Joubran, Hayt, Procaccia,

Adiel, Rivlin and Levy.
11. See, e.g., HCJ 3648/97 Stamka v. Minister of Interior, 53(2) PD 728 (1998);
AdminA 4614/05 State of Israel v. Oren, 61(1) PD 211 (2006).
12. True, in denying a request for family reunification, the person who's right was
infringed is identified, while in the case of an ideological exclusion, the right that was
infringed is the public's right to know, and not necessarily of a distinct citizen. In Israel,
the public's right to know was recognized in HCJ 243/62 Israel Movie Studios Ltd. v.

Greg, 16 PD 2407, 2414-15 (1962). In addition, while in many cases rights that belong
to the public (such as security), are used to trump individual rights, this is the opposite
case. Meaning, the public's right to know is in line with the individual's right to freedom of speech. For a discussion regarding how the public's right to security might
infringe on an individual's right to liberty, see CrimaA 2316/95 Ganimat v. State of

Israel, 49(3) PD 365 (1995) (holding that a felony which is a "national calamity" cannot, in itself, suffice for remanding without bail).
13. HCJ 9723/01 Levy v. Manager of Industry and Services Departmentfor For-

eign Workers' Permits, 57(2) PD 87 (2003).
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would enter Israel by "piggybacking" on citizens' free speech rights was an
obiter dictum in Levy, and was perfunctorily mentioned in the case, without
much elaboration. The Levy obiter was never referred to by a subsequent
court decision, and the notion that an alien might be allowed entry into the
country due to free speech concerns was neglected.1 4
The petitioner in Levy was the business manager of a group of Brazilian female dancers, who performed throughout Israel. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) rejected his application for renewal of the visas of four of the
dancers. The Ministry claimed that Levy should employ Israeli dancers instead. In his petition to the Court, Levy argued that MOI's refusal was unreasonable, as Israeli dancers could not perform the Brazilian folkloristic
dancing. He further argued that the refusal would harm him financially and
is a violation of his right to freedom of occupation.
The Court's starting point was the notion of SEP, but it then stated that
SEP must be balanced against competing interests. One of these interests,
the Court wrote, is freedom of occupation: "Migrant workers policy ....
should take into account, among other considerations, the person's [the citizen's] freedom of occupation and the possible violation of this right when
that person's occupation obligates employment of foreign workers, which
cannot be substituted by local workers."15
A second competing interest, continued the Court, is "freedom of expression and the exposure to the culture of the world." 16 After underlining
the importance of exposure to other cultures in fields such as art, science,
academia, sports and light entertainment, the Court wrote the following:
The aforementioned value of openness and exposure to the cultures of the world relates also to the individual's right to freedom of
expression, which is one of the fundamental values in law. Freedom
of expression is not only the freedom to express opinions, to write
and to perform, but also to "watch and listen" . . . The right to "watch
and listen" is granted to each person according to his own taste and
inclination. The exercise of such right could justify under certain circumstances permitting foreigners to sojourn in Israel and to work in
their unique fields [of occupation] . . . . This consideration should be

14. As will be discussed in Part III below, this notion was raised in the Supreme
Court's decision in AdminA 7216/18 Lara Alqasem v. Immigration and Population
Authority, para. 17 (Oct. 18, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew).
However, as I will argue there, the Court failed to discuss this idea in depth in the
Alqasem case as well.
15. Levy, supra note 13 at 92.

16. Id. at 94.
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included among the agency's considerations when it comes to set criteria for the sojourn of foreigners within different time boundaries.17

As mentioned above, the "piggybacking" obiter in Levy was never
cited by subsequent court decisions, not even in the cases discussed at
length in Part III, which revolved around restricting (potential) citizen-foreigner dialogue. Moreover, Israeli courts have so far overlooked the American legislation, mainly from the Cold War era, which sanctioned the
exclusion of foreigners based on their political ideology, the judicial review
of it - which dealt also with the "piggyback" argument - and the critical
review of it by American legal academia. This disregard to American jurisprudence on the matter is surprising, as Israeli courts frequently refer to
American precedents, particularly in the area of free speech. 18 I purport to
rectify this omission in this article, and to suggest a sound analysis of ideological bans on immigrants, which considers freedom of expression, building on the American experience.
Part I will introduce the concept of ideological exclusion by focusing
on American case law relevant to the issue. At the end of Part I, I discuss
possible implications of the American account for Israel, which experiences
a surge in the number of cases of ideological exclusions. Part II deals with
freedom of speech of citizens and aliens, along two axes. The first axis is
the location of the alien (whether outside of the country and wishing to
enter or inside the country and wishing to stay). The second axis is a citizen's vs. an alien's right to freedom of speech. The analysis suggests that an
alien, who is under a state's jurisdiction, is entitled to the protection offered
by the right to freedom of speech, alongside the citizens' correlative right. It
further suggests that, while aliens do not have a right to enter a foreign
country based on their own right to freedom of speech, the citizenry of that
country has a right that the state will not prevent the admission of foreigners
17. Id.
18. The most notable judgement is HCJ 73/53 Kol Ha'am v. Ministerof the Interior, 7 PD 871 (1953), where Justice Agranat held that freedom of expression is recognized in Israel. Pnina Lahav claims that Justice Agranat was highly influenced by his
American legal education and by a trip to the United States, made around the writing of
the Judgement. Pnina Lahav, FoundationsofRights Jurisprudencein Israel: ChiefJustice Agrantat's Legacy, 24 ISR. L. REv. 211, 247-51 (1990). For other free speech
judgements referring to American jurisprudence see HCJ 399/85 Kahane v. Broadcast-

ing Authority Management Board, 41(3) IsrSC 255 (1987); HCJ 153/83 Levi v. Commander of the Southern Districtof the IsraeliPolice, 38(2) PD 393 (1984) (for English
translation:

https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/opinions/levi-v-commander-southern-district-

israeli-police); HCJ 680/88 Schnitzer v. The Chief Military Censor, 42(4) PD 617
(1989) (for English translation: http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/

opinions/Schnitzer%20v.%20Chief%20Military%20Censor.pdf).
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due to their ideological belief. Part III introduces and analyzes Israeli case
law regarding ideological exclusions: The case of Barry Martin Lawrence
Barnett, a Messianic Jew who was deported from Israel for protesting with
other Messianic Jews; The Israeli-Palestinian Bereaved Families for Peace
case, which dealt with the decision of the Minister of Defense to forbid the
entry of Palestinians to Israel for the participation in an alternative Memorial Day ceremony; and the Anti-BDS legislation, which includes the 2011
Boycott Law, the 2017 Amendment to the Entry into Israel law, and the
judicial review of their constitutionality. Thereafter, a Conclusion is
offered.

I.

IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS

LESSON

FOR ISRAEL

No other democracy has engaged in explicit ideological exclusion of
immigrants as the United States of America. As Israel seems to be following the same path, I find it useful to discuss in some detail the American
background, nature, and evolvement of such bans throughout the years. After describing the American jurisprudence on this matter, I will present
some insights, which are - I believe - applicable to Israel.
A.

The Early Days

Ideological exclusions in the United States date back to the end of the
Colonial Period, when colonies excluded immigrants on the basis of unorthodox religious beliefs. 19 In 1903, following the 1901 assassination of
President William McKinley by an anarchist, 20 and a two decades long turmoil regarding the rise of Anarchism and Marxism in Europe, 2 1 the first
legislation denying entrance to the United States on the basis of political
belief and affiliation was enacted. 22 The Immigration Act of 1903 (hereinafter, the 1903 Act) allowed to exclude "anarchists, or persons who believe in

19. Mitchell C. Tilner, IdeologicalExclusion ofAliens: The Evolution of a Policy,
2 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 4-8 (1987). For a broad overview of ideological exclusions in
the United States from the 17th century to the 20th century, see id. at 8-65.
20. Sidney Fine, Anarchism and the Assassination of McKinley, 60 AM. HIsT.

REV. 777, 780-81 (1955).
21. See Tilner, supra note 19, at 13-26 (describing the domestic economic difficulties at that time and how the rise of Marxism in Europe triggered anti-alienism and
anti-radicalism in the United States).

22. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213. See also Tilner, supra note 19,
at 30-31. In 1907, Congress reenacted the 1903 Act and continued the exclusion of
Anarchists. See Tilner, supra note 19, at 36-39.
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or advocate the overthrow by force or violence law, or the assassination of
public officials" from entering the United States 23
The 1903 Act was reviewed and upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of United States ex rel. Turner
v. Williams.24 Turner, a citizen of England, delivered a lecture in New York
in which he declared himself to be an Anarchist. 25 He was subsequently put
under immigration detention, and brought before a Board of Special Inquiry
in the immigration station at Ellis Island, after a warrant signed by the Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor was issued against him. 26
Turner challenged the 1903 Act by claiming, among other things, that it
contravenes the free speech clause of the First Amendment. The Court held
that the 1903 Act is constitutional and upheld the proceedings against Turner. 27 "[A]s long as human governments endure," the Court wrote, "they
cannot be denied the power of self-preservation, as that question is
presented here." 2
The Act of 1903 was repealed by the Act of 1917 (hereinafter, the
1917 Act), 29 at a time of heated political climate regarding the United
States' imminent entry into World War 1.30 The 1917 Act retained the exclusion of anarchists, but also excluded aliens "who advocate or teach the
unlawful destruction of property." 31 This provision was meant to exclude
aliens supporting the Industrial Workers of the World. In 1918, soon after
the Russian Revolution, Congress enacted the Passport Act of 1918, which
prohibited aliens from entering the United States without a visa and documentation. 32 Later that year, The 1917 Act was amended and broadened,
thus excluding also aliens who teach the assassination of public figures and
the overthrow of government. 33
World War II provided the momentum needed for the introduction of
the Alien Registration Act of 1940, also known as the Smith Act. 34 The
Smith Act amended the Passport Act of 1918, adding former belief in or
advocacy of the proscribed doctrines (i.e. anarchism, overthrow of govern23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213, 1214.
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904).
Id. at. 280.
Id.
Id. at 291.
Id. at 295.
Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 87.

30. Tilner, supra note 19, at 39-40.

31.
32.
33.
34.

Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875-78.
Act of May 22, 1918, ch. 81, 40 Stat. 559.
Act of Oct. 16, 1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012 §1.
Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670.
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ment, destruction of property and assassination of public figures) as well as
former membership in organizations advocating said doctrines to the list of
grounds for exclusions and deportations from the United States.
In the case of Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, the Supreme Court examined whether the United States may deport a resident alien, staying legally in the country, because of membership in the Communist Party which
terminated before enactment of the Smith Act. 35 The appellants, three legal
aliens that were to be deported, all residing in the U.S. for over three decades, 36 contended, among other things, that their deportations are prejudicial to the First Amendment. The majority opinion held, however, that the
First Amendment does not prevent the deportation of the appellants, since
the advocation for a change of government by force and violence, as a
membership in the Communist party dictates, is not protected speech.
While the outcome was harsh for the appellants-deportees, it should be
noted that in its reasoning, the Court, for the first time, jettisoned its traditional view - dated from the Chinese Exclusion Case37 - that immigration policy is totally immune from judicial review. 38
B.

Exclusion under the McCarran-WalterAct (1952-1990)

In 1952, following an overridden veto by President Truman, 39 and preceding the height of the Cold War, the Immigration and Nationality Act of

35. Harisiadesv. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
36. Harisiades was a Greek national that lived in the United States for 36 years
and was a married to an American citizen. Mascitti, an Italian national, lived in the
United States for 32 years. Mrs. Coleman, a Russian native, was also married to an
American citizen, and lived in the United States for 38 years. All were members of the
Communist Party in their past.

37. Chae Chang Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
38. However, see Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion: "... .whether immigration laws have been crude and cruel, whether they may have reflected xenophobia in
general or anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism, the responsibility belongs to Congress.
Courts do enforce the requirements imposed by Congress upon officials in administering immigration laws, e.g., Kwock Jan Fatv. White, 253 U. S. 454, and the requirement
of Due Process may entail certain procedural observances. E.g., Ng Fung Ho v. White,
259 U. S. 276. But the underlying policies of what classes of aliens shall be allowed to
enter and what classes of aliens shall be allowed to stay are for Congress exclusively to
determine, even though such determination may be deemed to offend American traditions and may, as has been the case, jeopardize peace." Harisiades, supra note 35 at

597.
39. President's Message to Congress Vetoing the Immigration and Nationality

Act, 1952-53 PUB. PAPERS 441 (June 25, 1952).
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1952 (commonly known as "the McCarran-Walter Act") was enacted. 40
Section 1182(a)(27) authorized the consular officer and the Attorney General to exclude from entry to the United States aliens they had reason to
believe are seeking entry "....
solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States." 4 1 Section
1182(a)(28) dealt with, in much detail, the exclusions of aliens who are
affiliated with Anarchism and Communism. Finally, Section 1182(a)(29)
banned the entry to the United States of aliens with respect to whom the
consular officer or the Attorney General knows has reason to believe probably would, after entry, engage in activities that might undermine national
security or overthrow the Government. 42 Unlike Section 1182(a)(27) and
Section 1182(a)(29), Section 1182(a)(28) authorized the consular officer
and the Attorney General to exercise discretion and to grant a waiver to an
alien who is within any of the classes described, pursuant to a set of terms. 43
Most of the cases discussed below relate to this Section, which is the most
problematic - from a First Amendment perspective - of the three.
In Kleindienst v. Mandel, the United States Supreme Court addressed
the Attorney General's decision to exclude a Belgian citizen under Section
1182(a)(28) and not to issue a waiver.44 This is the principal and most important decision concerning ideological exclusion of immigrants handed
down by an American court, and possibly any court in the Western world,
and will therefore be discussed in more detail.
Ernest E. Mandel was a journalist and a publicist who advocated for
communism, 4 5 situated in Brussels. In 1969, he was invited to participate in
a six-day long conference on Technology and Third World, at Stanford
University, scheduled for October of that year. 46 He applied to the American Consulate in Brussels for a visa, and was informed that his application
40. Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1982)).
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27). The language used in this section derived from the
Act of June 20, 1941, ch. 209, 55 Stat. 252, which amended the Passport Act of 1918
and authorized the consular officers to refuse visas to any alien they knew or had reason
to believe sought entry into the United States to engage in activities which will endanger the public safety. See also Tilner, supra note 19, at 54.

42. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(29).
43. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28). The terms included involuntary membership, being 16
years of age, opposing public interest.

44. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
45. See,

e.g., ERNEST MANDEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO MARXIST ECONOMIC THE-

ORY (1967).
46. Kleindienst, 408 U.S., at 757.
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had been refused under Section 1182(a)(28), but that a request for a waiver
has been forwarded to the Department of State in Washington, D.C. Later,
the Department refused to issue a waiver because Mandel has violated the
conditions and limitations attached to the visa issued to him in a previous
visit to the United States, as he spoke at more universities than his visa
application indicated, thus engaging in activities beyond the stated purposes
of his trip. 47
Mandel and the various university professors who invited him appealed this refusal, against the Attorney General and the Secretary of State.
They asserted, among other things, that Section 1182(a)28 of the McCarren-Walter Act, preventing Mandel's entry to the United States, was unconstitutional as it stands in contravention of the First Amendment. 48 The
District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that "[t]he concern
of the First Amendment is not with a non-resident alien's individual and
personal interest in entering and being heard, but with the rights of the citizens of the country to have the alien enter and to hear him explain and seek
to defend his views." 4 9 Thus, Section 1182(a)(28) is invalid and void in
regarding to the exclusion of Mandel.50
The Attorney General and the Secretary of State appealed to the Supreme Court. Mandel agreed that he himself has no legal right to enter the
United States, and the case dealt with "the narrow issue whether the First
Amendment confers upon the appellee professors, because they wish to
hear, speak, and debate with Mandel in person, the ability to determine that
Mandel should be permitted to enter the country."5 1 The Court rejected the
Government's argument that the exclusion of Mandel does not contravene
the First Amendment and asserted that the First Amendment right of the
American academics who invited him was indeed infringed. 52 The Court
also rejected the Government's suggestion that because the appellees had
access to Mandel's ideas through his books, speeches and other technological alternatives, the First Amendment is inapplicable, and refused to hold
that the "....
existence of other alternatives extinguishes altogether any
constitutional interest on the part of the appellees in this particular form of
access." 5 3 Thereafter, the Court recognized that the power to exclude aliens
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id. at 758.
Id. at 760.
Mandel v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 620, 632 (E.D. N.Y. 1971).
Id. at 634.
Kleindienst, 408 U.S., at 762.
Id. at 764-65.

53. Id. at 765-66. Scholars have also asserted that the fact that an alternative to an
encounter exists is a defective rationale for its ban. James W. Mohr, Opening the Flood-

gates to DissidentAliens, 6 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 146-48 (1970) (claiming that
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is inherent to the idea of the state's sovereignty and mentioned Congress's
"plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude
those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden."5 4
Justice Blackmun, delivering the majority opinion of the Court, held
that when the Executive Branch provides "a facially legitimate and bona
fide reason" for denying a visa under Section 1182(a)(28), "courts will
neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor test it by balancing
its justification against the First Amendment interests."5 5 In doing so, the
majority refused to apply the regular standard of review applicable in cases
of ostensible free speech violation under American constitutional law, i.e.
strict scrutiny, which requires the government to demonstrate that it is using
the most narrowly tailored means to achieve a governmental interest that is
compelling (rather than a merely legitimate interest). Regarding Mandel, the
Court held that his previous visa violation was a facially legitimate and
bona fide reason for refusing to waive the Section 1182(a)(28) ban.
Justice Douglas, dissenting, held that solely problems of national security or the import of drugs are in the interest of the Attorney General in
this context. To his reading, Congress did not entrust the Attorney General
with the discretion to discriminate among the ideological offerings of foreign lecturers. 56 Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan, dissenting as well,
held that in addition to the appellees' (professors') interests, the Government has interfered with the public interest in the prevention of any stifling
of political utterance. 57 Thus, the standard for refusing a waiver cannot be a
"facially legitimate and bona fide reason," as "[m]erely 'legitimate' governmental interest cannot override constitutional rights."5 8 Consequently, the
standard for examining an exclusion of an alien based on her political views
(which she wishes to share with American citizens) is whether it is necessary to protect a compelling governmental interest, such as threats to national security, public health needs and genuine requirements of law
enforcement. 5 9

"[t]he opportunity to confront ideas directly, to challenge and to ferret out details, is
especially important to the academic and scientific communities and that the rationale
"presupposes that the only ideas worth hearing are those which have been published.").
54. Kleindienst, 408 U.S., at 766 (Citing Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturaliza-

tion Service, 387 U. S. 118, 123 (1967)).
55. Id. at 770.
56. Id. at 774.
57. Id. at 776.
58. Id. at 777.
59. Id. at 783-84.
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In 1977, following the Helsinki Accords of 1975,60 Congress enacted
the McGovern Amendment to the McCarren-Walter Act. 61 The Amendment
stipulated that the Secretary of State should recommend to the Attorney
General that a wavier be granted to any alien who is a member or affiliate
with a proscribed organization but otherwise admissible. The enactment of
the Amendment led to waivers of a substantial number of aliens who could
have been excluded under Section 1182(a)(28).62 In 1987, Section 901 of
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act was enacted and prohibited visa
denials based on "beliefs, statements, or associations" which would be protected if engaged in by an American citizen in the United States. 63
In 1989, in American Arab Anti-Discrimination Com. v. Meese,64 the

District Court of California held, while citing Harisiades,that foreign nationals legally staying in the U.S. (to be differentiated from immigrants
wishing to enter the U.S. - such as Mandel at the time) are protected by
the First Amendment even in the deportation setting, and that a regular First
Amendment standard would be applied by the courts in reviewing their deportation orders. The plaintiffs, charged with being members of or affiliated
with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), who were
issued deportation orders on such ground, challenged several Sections of
the McCarran-Walter Act, dealing with exclusion of aliens already in the
U.S., based on their ideology. 65 The District Court found the Sections to be
unconstitutional as being in violation of the plaintiff's First Amendment.
60. Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Aug. 1,

1975, Dep't of State Pub. No. 8826 (Gen. For. Pol. Ser. 298), reprinted in 14 I.L.M.
1292, 1313-14 (1975). Under the Helsinki Accords, United States took an obligation to
promote international freedom of information and movement. The Helsinki Accords
lack the power of a treaty, and obligations under the agreement are not legally binding.
For more information regarding the Helsinki Accords, see Carlos Ortiz Miranda, Rethinking the Role of Politics in United States ImmigrationLaw: The Helsinki Accords
and Ideological Exclusion of Aliens, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV 301 (1988).

61. Act of Aug. 17, 1977, Pub. L. 95-105, tit. I, § 112, 91 Stat. 844, 848 (codified
as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (1982)).
62. Tilner, supra note 19, at 78. See also Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F. 2d 1043,
1048-49 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that the government can't avoid the McGovern
amendment by denying visa application under Section (a)(27) on the basis of affiliation
with a communist organization).

63. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 901(a), 101 Stat.
1331, 1399-1401 (1987).
64. American Arab Anti-Discrimination Com. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D.

Cal. 1989).
65. 8 U.S. C. §§ 1251(a)(6)(D), (F)(iii), (G)(v), (H) (provisions which allowed for
the deportation of aliens for advocating or teaching opposition to all organized government, the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism, or
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The judgment was overturned by the Court of Appeals due to lack of ripeness of the issues, and remanded to the District Court for further deliberation. 66 However, the matter became moot shortly thereafter. In 1990, after
suspending the ideological exclusion provisions of the McCarran-Walter
Act, 67 Congress repealed the Act permanently and enacted the Immigration
Act of 1990, which offered a narrower basis for an exclusion based on ideological criteria. 68
During its 38 years, the McCarran-Walter Act sanctioned the exclusion
of assertive, knowledgeable, intelligent, inspiring and interesting people (at
least in the eyes of some members of American society), such as Nobel
prize-winning author Gabriel Garcia Marquez, playwright Dario Fo, actress
Franca Rame, NATO Deputy Supreme Commander Nino Pasti, and Horten-

sia Allende, widow of former Chilean President Salvador Allende. 69 There
were many others, not as famous as the previously mentioned ones. When
the act was finally repealed, there seemed to be a consensus that it was a
long overdue instrument, associated with the infamous McCarthy era.
However, there seems to be a crawling comeback of ideological, semiideological or quasi-ideological exclusion of foreigners in current American
immigration law. Communism, which replaced anarchism, was soon replaced by terrorism as the top national security concern affecting
immigrants. 70
C.

9/11 and Its Aftermath

Shortly after the horrific Al Qaeda attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, and as a direct response thereof, Congress enacted the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, commonly referred
to as "the PATRIOT Act." Currently, Section 411 of the PARTIOT Act
authorizes the Government to exclude any alien who had used a "position
of prominence within any country to endorse or espouse terrorist activity,"
the establishment in the United States of a totalitarian dictatorship and being a member
in organizations that in engage in such activities).
66. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Com. v. Thornburgh, 940 F. 2d 445 (9th

Cir. 1999).
67. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No.

100-204, § 901(a), 101 Stat. 1331 (1987).
68. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649 (1990). See also W. Aaron
Vandiver, Checking Ideas at the Border: Evaluating the Possible Renewal of Ideologi-

cal Exclusion, 55 EMORY L.J. 751, 759-60 (2006).
69. See John Shattuck, FederalRestrictions on the FreeFlow of Academic Infor-

mation and Ideas, 3 Gov'T INFO. Q. 5, 14-15 (1986).
70. Vandiver, supra note 68, at 761.
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or to "persuade others to support terrorist activity or a terrorist organization." 1 Section 411 also broadens the definition of terrorist activity in the
Immigration and Nationality Act to include any crime that involves the use
of a "weapon or dangerous device (other than for mere personal monetary
gain)." 7 2
In addition, the REAL ID Act7 3 eliminated the Secretary of State's
need to substantiate that an alien's putative endorsement could undermine
the United States' effort to combat terrorism. 74 It also further expanded the
use of ideological criteria, as an alien does not have to be in a position of
prominence, and merely has to espouse or endorse terrorist activity to be
inadmissible. 75 It also modified the Immigration and Nationality Act to define "engaging in terrorist activity" broadly. The definition includes "solicit[ing] funds or other things of value for . . . . a terrorist organization
described in clause (vi)(III), unless the solicitor can demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that he did not know, and should not reasonably
have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization."7 6 The definition of "terrorist organization" was also broadened considerably. It includes "a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not,
which engages in, or has a subgroup which engages in, the activities described in subclauses (I) through (VI) of clause (iv)." 77 The said subclauses
include committing, planning, soliciting funds for, soliciting individuals for,
or providing material support for a terrorist activity. 7 8
For example, in the case of Khan v. Holder,79 the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed a denial of asylum and withholding of removal
due to the fact that Khan, a citizen of India, has been involved in the Kashmir independence movement and worked with the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front ("JKLF"), a group dedicated to the establishment of an
71. PATRIOT Act of 2001, § 411, amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(VI)
(2005). See also Hasan Z. Mansori, ManipulatingPublic Debate: Using the PATRIOT
Act to Keep Out Foreign Scholars, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV 205 (2008).

72. PATRIOT Act § 411(a), amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b) (2005).
For example, Section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal
Years 1988 and 1989 defined "terrorism" as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine
agents."

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

REAL ID Act of 2005, § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VII) (2005).
PATRIOT Act of 2001, § 411, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(VI) (2005).
REAL ID Act of 2005, § 103(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VII) (2005).
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)(cc).
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi).
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv).
Khan v. Holder, 584 F.3d 773 (9th Cir. 2009).
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independent Kashmir. In Khan's testimony, that was found credible by the
lower instances, he asserted that he was affiliated with only the political
wing of the JKLF, that his work was entirely nonviolent in nature, and that
he had no knowledge of the activities of the military wing of the JKLF.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals upheld the ruling that Khan was statutorily ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal under the REAL ID
Act because he had engaged in a terrorist activity. 80
D.

The Trump Bans and the Mandel Heritage

Shortly after his inauguration, President Trump introduced Executive
Order 13769, then Executive Order 13780, and finally Proclamation 9645,
all dealing with the exclusion of aliens from countries with predominant
Muslim population.81 The constitutionality of all these measures was chal80. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV).
81. The first Executive Order released by President Trump (Exec. Order No.

13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) temporarily suspended entry into the United
States of immigrants and

nonimmigrants from countries referred

to in Section

217(a)(12) of the Immigration and Nationality Act-i.e. Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Su-

&

dan, Syria, and Yemen altogether. In the Executive Order, the President "proclaim[ed] that the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States . . . . from
[these] countries . . . . would be detrimental to the interests of the United States." Id. at
§ 3(c). See Amy L. Moore, Even When You Win, You Lose: Executive Order 13769
the Depressing State of ProceduralDue Process in the Context of Immigration, 26
WILLIAM & MARY BILL RTS. J. 65, 88-91 (2017). The Executive Order also suspended
the United States Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days. Following an injunction
upheld by the Ninth Circuit against the Executive Order (Washington v. Trump (Wash-

ington II), 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017)), President Trump issued a second temporary
Executive Order, replacing the first one.

The second Executive Order (Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6,
2017)), subtitled "Executive Order Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry
into the United States," exempted lawful permanent residents, current visa-holders and
took Iraq off the list of banned countries. In addition, a waiver program for refugees
was instituted. Injunctions against the revised Executive Order were upheld by the
Courts of Appeals of the Forth Circuit (InternationalRefugee Assistance Project v.

Trump, 857 F. 3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017)) and the Ninth Circuit (Hawaiiv. Trump, 859 F.
3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017)), and the Supreme Court issued a stay of the injunctions (Trump
v. InternationalRefugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080). The stay narrowed the
scope of the injunctions and exempted from the revised Executive Order foreign nationals with a "bona fide relationship" with a U.S. person or entity in the United States.
Finally, in September 2017, President Trump announced Proclamation 9645 (Proc-

lamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24. 2017)). It suspends entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants from Chad, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Yemen, and
of immigrants from Somalia, and denies entry into the United Stated of certain officials
of the government of Venezuela. The Ninth Circuit upheld an injunction against the
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lenged before the federal court system, and analyzed in a number of preliminary yet lengthy decisions. All these decisions, including the one handed
down by the Supreme Court, recognized the standing of American individuals and entities (such as State Universities) to bring action against the measures due to their allegation that the ban burdens their own constitutional
rights.8 2 At the time of the writing of this article, the Supreme Court handed
down an elaborate decision reversing the lower courts' nationwide preliminary injunction against the Proclamation. 83 This decision, while remanding
the case to the lower court to discuss the merits of the case, left little
grounds to strike the Proclamation down.
The main argument against the two Executive Orders (currently not in
force) and the Proclamation was that they are motivated by the desire to
keep Muslims out of the United States, and therefore violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, which provides that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." The Government denied that religious-based considerations motivated any of these measures, and insisted that security-based reasons are the grounds for it.
As Mandel dealt with a First Amendment challenge to an immigration
restriction, and since both free speech and freedom of religion are protected
by the First Amendment, the Trump v. Hawaii84 Court inevitably revisited
the Mandel case. While Chief Justice Roberts, in his principal majority
opinion, rejected Justice Sotomayor's view (in her principal dissent opinion), that Mandel's narrow standard of review was inapplicable to the
case, 85 he nevertheless agreed to slightly raise the standard of judicial re-

Proclamation but narrowed its scope to give relief "only to those with a credible bona

fide relationship with the United States." (Hawaii v. Trump, No. 17-17168 (9th Cir.
2017)).
82. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U.S. _, 30 (2018) (Chief Justice Roberts'
majority opinion).

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Justice Sotomayor argued that "there is a good reason to think" that Mandel
was inapplicable to the case for a variety of reasons, discussed in footnote 5 of her
opinion, among them that Mandel "involved a constitutional challenge to an Executive
Branch decision to exclude a single foreign national under a specific statutory ground of
inadmissibility . . . . Here, by contrast, President Trump is not exercising his discretionary authority to determine the admission or exclusion of a particular foreign national.
He promulgated an executive order affecting millions of individuals on a categorical
basis. ." Id. at 14 (Justice Sotomayor, dissenting). Chief Justice Roberts rejected this
view since "our opinions have reaffirmed and applied its [Mandel's] deferential standard of review across different contexts and constitutional claims." (Id. at 31).
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view, based on the government's own acknowledgment, and "assuming"
that such higher standard of review is the correct one:
A conventional application of Mandel, asking only whether the
policy is facially legitimate and bona fide, would put an end to our
review. But the Government has suggested that it may be appropriate
here for the inquiry to extend beyond the facial neutrality of the order
.... For our purposes today, we assume that we may look behind the
face of the Proclamation to the extent of applying rational basis review. That standard of review considers whether the entry policy is
plausibly related to the Government's stated objective to protect the
country and improve vetting processes . . . . As a result, we may
consider plaintiffs' extrinsic evidence, but will uphold the policy so
long as it can reasonably be understood to result from a justification
independent of unconstitutional grounds. 86

So, while Chief Justice Roberts rejected Justice Sotomayor's opinion,
that the strict scrutiny test, normally applicable to cases involving First
Amendment ostensible violation, is applicable to the case, he did - de
facto and arguendo, at least - agree to raise the standard of review from a
Mandel's "facially legitimate and bona fide reason" low standard of review
to a higher (yet not too high) "rational basis" standard of review. The main
difference between these two standards is that, according to the latter, the
Court would examine whether the reason that the government gives for its
act is actually and not just facially legitimate, and furthermore, inquire
whether a rational connection exists between that reason and the means
used to attain it. Still, legitimacy - rather than a compelling governmental
interest and proportionality stricto sensu87 - is the normative criterion espoused in Trump v. Hawaii to override First Amendment concerns. 88

86. Id. at 32.
87. A proportionate balance between the social benefit embedded in the permissive goal and the harm caused to the constitutional right. See: Aharon Barak, Proportionality andPrincipledBalancing,4 LAw & ETHICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1, at 6 (2010).
88. However, Chief Justice Roberts insinuates that when the exclusion in not
based on national security or foreign affairs considerations, he might be willing to espouse a standard of review more stringent than the "rational basis" one. See in his
footnote 5: "The dissent finds 'perplexing' the application of rational basis review in
this context . . . . But what is far more problematic is the dissent's assumption that
courts should review immigration policies, diplomatic sanctions, and military actions
under the de novo "reasonable observer" inquiry applicable to cases involving holiday
displays and graduation ceremonies. . . The dissent can cite no authority for its proposition that the more free-ranging inquiry it proposes is appropriate in the national security
and foreign affairs context."
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Insightsfor Israel

This brief description of American law demonstrates that Israel is not
the first democracy in the world to exclude aliens from its territory based on
their ideological convictions. Still, such a policy is extraordinary, and other
democracies generally refrained from espousing ideological exclusions of
foreigners in their immigration laws (other than in cases involving clear
security-based concerns). 89 Moreover, the American jurisprudence on ideological exclusion of foreigners, and the Mandel decision in particular, were
criticized by numerous legal articles. 90 Judy Wurtzel, 91 for example, argued
that the specific circumstances of Mandel (his previous visa abuses) prevented the Supreme Court from offering additional examples as to what will
be considered a legitimate and bona fide reason for visa refusal. 92 As a
result, lower courts 93 were able to interpret the standard as they deemed fit,
usually in a broad manner. This led the Mandel standard to be toothless.
89. See, e.g., Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c 27, art 77
(Can.) (allowing for the Canadian Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to sign a
certificate stating that a permanent resident or foreign national is inadmissible on
grounds of security. On 1998, Syrian citizen Hassan Almrei applied for a visitor's visa.
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) determined that "Almrei behaved in
a clandestine manner and that he visited a number of Arab Afghans," thus labeled him
as a threat to security and as a member of an Al Qaeda sleeper cell. Only eight years
after his arrest, the security certificate against him was disposed. Sherene H. Razack,
"Your Client has a Profile:" Race and National Security in Canada After 9/11, 40

STUD. L. POL. & Soc'Y 3, 23 (2007)); Immigration Rules, (2016), para. 322(5) (allows
for the refusal of a request to enter to or to remain in the United Kingdom of an alien
for, among other things, " .... character or associations or the fact that he represents a
threat to national security." This Rule was labeled as an ......
immigration rule designed to tackle terrorism and those judged to be a threat to national security." Amelia
Hill, Government U-turn over Anti-Terror Provision Used to Expel Migrants, THE
GUARDIAN (June 1, 2018) (https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/may/29/govern
ment-review-anti-terror-law-section- 322-5-migrant-deport).
90. See, e.g., Steven R. Shapiro, Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to

PoliticalDissidents, 100 HARV. L. REV. 930, 936 (1987); Leonard David Egert, Granting Foreigners Free Speech Rights: The End of Ideological Exclusions, 8 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 721, 744-45 (1990); Mark W. Voigt, Visa Denials on Ideological
Grounds and the FirstAmendment Right to Receive Information: The Case for Stricter

JudicialScrutiny, 17 CUMB. L. REV. 139 (1986).
91. Judy Wurtzel, First Amendment Limitations on the Exclusion of Aliens, 62

N.Y.U. L. REV. 149 (1987).
92. Id. at 163-64.
93. Wurtzel discussed the following cases: Abourezk v. Reagan, 592 F. Supp. 880

(D.D.C. 1984), vacated, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986);
HarvardLaw School Forum v. Shultz, 633 F. Supp. 525 (D. Mass. 1986), vacated as
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Wurtzel further argued that the Mandel standard is simply wrong. She
offered an interesting analogy between the right of a U.S. citizen to exchange ideas with a prisoner and the right of a U.S. citizen to exchange
ideas with a foreigner. 9 4 In Procunierv. Martinez95 (which, interestingly
enough, was cited in agreement by the Israeli Supreme Court 96), the American Supreme Court held that while prisoners enjoy a diminished protection
under the First Amendment, the exchange of letters between prisoners and
outsiders is entitled to full constitutional protection, as "the interests of both
parties are inextricably meshed." 97 According to Wurtzel, this holding is
relevant to ideological exclusions of foreigners (which - like prisoners
might enjoy limited First Amendment protection themselves), and corresponds with the dissenting opinions of Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan
in Mandel, demanding a compelling government interest in order to justify
curtailment of freedom of speech of the citizen who wishes to interact in a
discussion with the foreigner. 98 Therefore, an exclusion of an alien by the
government can be based on the content of his or her speech only if it could
be established that the speech poses a clear and present danger to public
security rather than that he or she merely advocates for a subversive doctrine or is affiliated with a disfavored organization. 99
The academic criticism of the exclusionary provisions of the McCarran-Walter Act, expressed by Wurtzel and others, the discomfort expressed
by some of the American judges reviewing it, and the final repeal of the
Act, demonstrate that the legal trend is against such ideological exclusion of
foreigners. True, following the horrible attacks of 9/11 the pendulum swung
back in the U.S. towards ideological bans, with the PATRIOT Act and the
REAL ID Act as described above. But it is still a far narrower exclusion
than the bans which were part of the McCarran-Walter Act. President
Trump's two Executive orders and finally Proclamation 9645, all dealing
with the exclusion of aliens from countries with predominant Muslim population, were also justified by the government (whether truthfully or pretexmoot, No. 86-1371 (1st Cir. June 18, 1986); Allende v. Shultz, 605 F. Supp. 1220 (D.
Mass. 1985); NGO Comm. v. Haig, No. 82 Civ. 3636 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1982)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) aff'd mem., 697 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1982); ElWerfalli
v. Smith, 547 F. Supp. 152 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). Wurtzel, supra note 91, at 164-71
94. Wurtzel, supra note 91, at 175-79.

95. Procunierv. Martinez, 416 US 396 (1974).
96. Pris. Pet. App. 4463/94 HCJ 4409/94 Golan v. Israel Prison Authority, PD
50(4) 136 (1996) (The Supreme Court of Israel cites Martinez and adopts its ruling on
the diminished right of prisoners to freedom of speech).

97. Martinez, 416 US 409.
98. Supra note 44, at 777.
99. Wurtzel, supra note 91, at 193.
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tually) - just like the PATRIOT Act and the REAL ID Act - on strict
security concerns. These explanations were accepted by the Supreme Court,
and stand at the basis of its refusal to issue a temporary injunction against
the Proclamation. 100 In discussing the Trump Proclamation, the Court has
also shown a willingness to jettison Mandel's very narrow standard of review, even in matters involving national security and foreign affairs concerns, and a strong dissent, led by Justice Sotomayor, called for an even
heightened standard of review, i.e. one conditioning ideological exclusion
based on evidence of compelling governmental interests.
The Israeli Supreme Court, as I will discuss below, is still a novice in
dealing with these intersections of free speech and immigration, and one
could only hope that it will not revert to the unfortunate Mandel test, which
is eroded even in the United States. It should be open to contemplate the
opinions of the minority judges, not only the majority ones, both in Mandel
and in Trump v. Hawaii.101

Furthermore, the American experience proves how easy and dangerous
it is to disregard the constitutional rights of foreigners and the people who
100. See supra text accompanying notes 81-88.
101. The Supreme Court of Israel ruled, that at least certain aspects freedom of
speech - among them political speech - are covered by Basic Law: Human Dignity and

Liberty (See, e.g., HCJ 10203/03 "HamifkadHaleumi" Ltd. V. Attorney General, 62(4)
PD 200, 215-218 (2008); the Avnery case, supra note 137) ("basic laws" being part of
Israeli unique and incomplete constitution; See: Yoseph M. Edrey, The Israeli Constitutional Revolution/Evolution, Models of Constitutions, and a Lesson from Mistakes and

Achievements, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 77 (2005)). Under Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty, a governmental act or a statute, which violates a right protected by the basic
law, could survive judicial review only if the violation was done for a proper purpose,
and - furthermore - was proportionate. The Supreme Court has recognized three subtests to examine the proportionality of the violation. "The first subtest is the rational
connection test, which examines whether the legislation that violates the constitutional
right is consistent with the purpose that it is intended to realize. The second subtest is
the least harmful measure test. This test requires us to examine whether, of all the
possible measures for realizing the purpose of the violating law, the measure that harms
the protected constitutional right to the smallest possible degree was chosen. The third
subtest is the test of proportionality in the narrow sense. This test requires the violation
of the protected constitutional right to be reasonably commensurate with the social advantage that arises from the violation." (HCJ 2605/05 Academic Center of Law and
Business v. Minister of Finance, 63(2) PD 545 (2009); for English translation: https://
supreme.court.gov.il/sites/en/Pages/External.aspx/?&type=4). The "proper purpose" criterion seems similar to the Mandelian "legitimate reason" standard. The first subset of
the proportionality criterion resembles the "rational basis" standard of the majority
opinion in Trump v. Hawaii, and the third subtest of the proportionality criterion resembles the strict scrutiny standard advocated by the minority opinion s in Mandel and
Trump v. Hawaii.
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wish to interact with them. Constitutional rights are supposed to be solid,
and to resist ephemeral political atmosphere and changing public opinion.
Unfortunately, when it comes to foreigners (including, sometimes, ancestors of foreigners), American jurisprudence has known some horrific displays of inhumanity towards them, and the case of ideological exclusion of
foreigners interweaves with this alarming past and present. The ideological
exclusion Articles, which were part of McCarran-Walter Act, were enacted
during the Cold War era, and as part of McCarthyism. They were rescinded
- after much criticism - at the end of the Cold War, but since then new
initiatives of a similar background are being introduced as black letter
American law.
In Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court, explicitly for the first time,
overruled the infamous 1944 Korematsu decision, 10 2 which allowed for the
internment of people of Japanese descent (including ones who were American citizens) during World War II in the name of national security. However, Justice Sotomayor, in her dissent, cautioned that by allowing the
Trump Proclamation to remain intact "the Court redeploys the same dangerous logic underlying Korematsu and merely replaces one 'gravely wrong'
decision with another." 103 Israel should not blindly follow the American
path of ideological exclusions. If anything, it should pay attention to the
criticism of it from both within the U.S. and outside of it.
II.

FREEDOM OF SPEECH OF CITIZENS AND ALIENS

My analysis of the three Israeli case studies discussed in Part III below
will rely on two distinct, yet related, axes. One axis is the location of the
foreigner: outside of the country (wishing to enter) or inside the country
(wishing to stay). The second axis is the citizen's vs. the foreigner's right to
freedom of speech (either as a speaker or as a listener).
The first axis is relevant, as countries around the world, including
Israel, generally apply their laws, and bestow constitutional civil and political rights, on a territorial or jurisdictional basis. That is, on any person present within the geographical boundaries or jurisdiction of the state.
Applying domestic laws to events occurring or persons outside of a state's
territory or jurisdiction is the exception to the rule. Similarly, states generally apply their domestic laws - including basic civil and political human
rights - on persons within the state's territory or jurisdiction, regardless of
their civil status. This rule has exceptions, 104 but it is still the rule, at least
102. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944).
103. Trump v. Hawaii, 585 U. S. 28 (2018) (Sonia Sotomayor J., Dissenting).
104. For example, according to international human rights law, the right to vote
and be appointed to public office generally applies to citizens only, and not to foreign-

2019-2020]

Ideological Exclusion

103

with regard to the most basic human rights, freedom of expression included. 105 Most domestic legal systems, as well as international human
rights law, adhere to this principle of territoriality.
The 14th Amendment of the American Constitution, for example, explicitly provides that "[n]o State shall .... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Most other rights, under the
American Bill of Rights, are also conferred to "persons" rather than "citizens." American courts were very clear in their differentiation between the
bestowal of constitutional rights on foreigners who are present (whether
legally or illegally) on American soil and the refusal to bestow such rights
on foreigners who are subject to acts by American officials outside of
American territory or jurisdiction. 106 For this very reason, the District Court
ruled in the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Com. case mentioned

above, that the ideological exclusion embedded in the McCarran-Walter
Act was unconstitutional and void as far as it applies to foreigners within
U.S. territory, but was valid insofar as foreigners abroad (wishing to enter
the U.S.) were concerned. 107
Similarly, in Israel, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty bestows
most of the constitutional rights it refers to (including the non-enumerated

ers residing in the country (see, e.g., Article 25 to the ICCPR). The exact constitutional
protection that a country offers foreigners within its territory changes from country to
country. For the U.S., see the enlightening account by Linda Bosniak, THE CITIZEN AND

(2006) 49-69.
105. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135
(1945).
THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP ACCOUNT

106. David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional
Rights as Citizens?, 25 THOMAS JEFFERSON L. REV. 365 (2003). In his concurring opinion in Bridges v. Wixon, ibid at p. 161, Justice Murphy articulated this stand most
clearly: "The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission for the
first time to these shores. But, once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country,
he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all people within
our borders. Such rights include those protected by the First and the Fifth Amendments
and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. None of these provisions
acknowledges any distinction between citizens and resident aliens. They extend their
inalienable privileges to all 'persons,' and guard against any encroachment on those
rights by federal or state authority." The Supreme Court of the United States has recently reiterated this principle in Agency for InternationalDevelopment v. Alliancefor
Open Society International,Inc., 591 U.S. __ (2020).
107. American Arab Anti-Discrimination Com. v. Meese,
(1989). See supra note 64. For a discussion on non-Americans'
under U.S. law, see Michael Kagan, When Immigrants Speak: The
Non-Citizen Speech under the FirstAmendment, 57 B.C. L. REV.

714 F. Supp. 1060
right to free speech
PrecariousStatus of
(2016).
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freedom of speech 108) on "persons" rather than citizens

09

or residents. 110 In

1 Judge Procaccia ruled:
Kav LaOved v. Ministry of Interior"

The basic constitutional principles anchored in Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty are applicable to a foreign worker staying in Israel, and intend to protect his life, body, dignity, property,
personal liberty, right to leave Israel, privacy and intimacy. At the
center of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty stands the human

being.
The Basic Law applies, therefore, for its most part, on every person
present in Israel, regardless of civil status, religion, activities, opinion etc. 1 2
International human rights law (to be distinguished from other
brunches of international law with universal application, such as international criminal law) follows the same legal line. True, the European Convention of Human Rights (1950) contains Article 16, which supposedly
excludes aliens from freedom of speech protection.1 3 This Article has been,

108. See, e.g., HCJ 4804/94 Station Film Company v. Film and Play Review
Board, 50(5) IsrSC 661, 674-675 (1997) (holding that freedom of speech is a constitutional right, as it is a component of human dignity, protected by the Basic Law). But See

e.g., PPA 4463/94 Golan v. PrisonsService 50(4) PD 146, 190-192 (1996) (holding that
while the freedom of speech is a basic right, and not only deduced from the right to
dignity, since the right to freedom of speech is not listed in the Basic Law, only infringement of the right that also infringes the right to dignity is prohibited by the Basic
Law)
109. Article 6(b) is the only article of the basic law that refers to "citizen" rather
than "person"; it provides: "Every Israel citizen has the right of entry into Israel from
abroad."
110. Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation refers to the rights of "residents," rather
than "persons."

111. HCJ 11437/05 Kav LaOved v. The Ministry of Interior (Apr. 13, 2011), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew).

112. Id. at 160.
113. "Nothing in Articles 10 [freedom of expression], 11 [freedom of assembly
and association] and 14 [prohibition of discrimination] shall be regarded as preventing
the High Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions on the political activity of
aliens."
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however, unequivocally criticized by international law scholars1 4 and by
the Council of Europe itself 115 As Juliane Kokot and Beate Rudolf wrote:
The provision no longer reflects the present status of international human rights law. Article 16 dates from a time when it was
considered legitimate to restrict the political activities of aliens generally. The underlying rationale was that these activities were apt to
disrupt a state's external relations. However, subsequent human
rights treaties, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights and the African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights, all do without such a
clause. Legal writers had criticized the provision as being entirely
without limits and thus hardly compatible with the system of the

Convention. 11 6
In Peringekv. Switzerland, a Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights basically adopted this legal stand. 17 It mentioned the position of the European Commission of Human Rights against Article 16, and
observed that it
has never been applied by .... the Court, and unbridled reliance on it
to restrain the possibility for aliens to exercise their right to freedom

114. See, e.g., Juan Fernando Durin Alba, Restrictions on the Political Activity of
Aliens Under Article 16 ECHR, in EUROPE OF RIGHTS: A COMPENDIUM ON THE EURO-

PEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 497 (Javier Garcia Roca & Pablo Santolaya eds.,
2012); Juliane Kokott & Beate Rudolf, Piermont v. France, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 456,
458-60 (1996) (claiming that Article 16 allowed for unfettered discretion and thus had
to be interpreted in a way that will constrain discretion given to the Contracting Parties); H6lene Lambert, The position of Aliens in Relation to the European Convention

on Human Rights 25-26 (2007).
115. In Recommendation 799 (1977) on the political rights and position of aliens,
the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly called for Article 16 to be repealed
(point 10 (c) of the recommendation). In Piermont v. France the Commission argued
before the European Court of Human Rights that Article 16 reflects an outdated understanding of international law (see Piermont v. France, nos. 15773/89 and 15774/89,
Commission's report of 20 January 1994, unpublished, § 58).

116. Kokott & Rudolf, supra note 114, at 458.
117. Peringek v. Switzerland, Eur. Ct. H.R., paras. 121-22 (2015), https://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-158235. This was the second case of the European Court
of Human Rights to ever discuss Article 16, and the first and only one to date, to rule on
its essence. In Piermont v. France, 314 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1995) the Court discussed a petition filed by a German member of the European Parliament, who argued
that her freedom of expression was violated while she was visiting French Polynesia
and New Caledonia. The Court ruled that Article 16 is inapplicable to a national of a
member state of the EU (while visiting another member state), and particularly not to a
member of the European Parliament.
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of expression would run against the Court's rulings in cases in which
aliens have been found entitled to exercise this right without any suggestion that it could be curtailed by reference to Article 16.

It then ruled that the Article should be interpreted restrictively as only
capable of authorizing restrictions on "activities" that directly affect the political process.118
Article 16 of the European Convention of Human Rights is, indeed, in
variance with current international human rights law. The International
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 11 9 - which protects,
among other rights, freedom of expression, 120 and which has been ratified
by a high number of states worldwide - is clear about the signatory states'
responsibility to protect the rights of every person within its territory:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, nationalor social origin, property, birth or
other status. 121

The principle of territorial or jurisdictional application applies in specific areas of international human rights law as well, including in the field
of immigration. For example, while a state is obliged, under the Refugee
Convention, to protect and bestow rights on refugees within their territory
or jurisdiction, it is not obliged to assist refugees or displaced people
outside of it.122

118. The grand chamber ruled that Peringek, a Turkish political figure who was
convicted by a Swiss Court for publicly denying the Armenian genocide, is entitled to
Article 10 protection, as Article 16 does not apply to the case according to the abovementioned limited interpretation of it. Hence, the Grand Chamber ruled in favor of
Peringek, and held that he should have not been indicted by the Swiss authorities to
begin with. It is not clear what counts as an activity which directly affects the political
process. Christoph Grabenwarter, an Austrian legal scholar and the Vice President of
the Austrian Constitutional Court, suggested that a foreigner wishing to become the
leader of a major party might serve as an exception to that rule. Christoph
Grabenwarter, Reception ofMigrants: Material and ProceduralGuaranteesfor Settled
Migrants 4 (European Court of Human Rights Seminar, 2017), https://
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Speech_20170127_Grabenwarter_JY_ENG.pdf.
119. Israel signed and ratified.

120. ICCPR, art. 19.
121. Id. at art. 2 (emphasis added).
122. JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER,

THE LAW OF REFUGEE

STATUS

26-27 (2d ed. 2014) (" .... even the most basic refugee rights can be claimed only once
a refugee comes under the jurisdiction of a state party.").
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Moreover, the notion that whomever is in a country's territory is entitled to constitutional rights is not only ingrained in domestic legal systems
and international law; it is also supported in the writings of some leading
political theorists. One of them is Linda Bosniak, who coined the term "ethical territoriality" to reflect the ethical conviction that aliens should be entitled to legal rights ordinarily bestowed by the host country to its citizens, by
their mere presence in that country. 123
One complexity should, however, be mentioned: that of the physical
versus the legal presence of the foreigner in the country of destination.
Some states, among them the United States 124 and Israel, 125 sometimes employ a legal fiction, according to which a person could be on the state's soil
yet - as she was not yet admitted into the country (e.g. is in the airport, not
allowed to pass through immigration control) - considered to be outside of
it. Such a person, fictitiously considered to be outside of the country's territory, is therefore doomed undeserving of certain constitutional protections.
This legal fiction has, however, never been adopted by international human
rights law. 1 2 6
Political theorists also reject this fiction of physically present yet legally absent, and some of them convincingly argue that these aliens are
entitled to constitutional protection despite their short stay in the country of
destination. True, the "affiliation" argument, which holds that migrants'
rights are based on the ethical weight given to migrants' attachment to the
country where they actually live in (its culture, inhabitants, etc.) cannot
stand for these aliens. They did not, after all, stay in the country of destina123. See Linda Bosniak, Being Here: Ethical Territorialityand the Rights of Im-

migrants, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 389 (2007).
124. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
For a discussion of the fiction in American law see: Linda Bosniak, A Basic Territorial

Distinction, 16 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 407 (2002).
125. See HCJ 7302/07 Hotline for Migrant Workers v. Minister of Defense (July
7, 2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (A petition submitted by a
number of human rights organizations that seeks to examine Israel's policy regarding
"pushing back" (i.e. deporting) to Egypt of groups of foreigners - among them, potentially, asylum seekers - immediately upon their entry by foot into Israeli territory. The
High Court of Justice rejected the petition because the State has decided to suspend the
implementation of the said policy).
126. See, e.g., Hathaway and Foster, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS (2nd ed.,
2014) 23 ; Tally Kritzman-Amir & Thomas Spijkerboer, On the Morality and Legality
of Borders: Border Policies and Asylum Seekers, 26 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 1, 10-28
(2013) (discussing various aspects of the Non-refoulement principle as the source for
the principle of non-rejection at the border, while citing relevant case law of the Euro-

pean Court of Human Rights); PlaintiffM61 and PlaintiffM69 v. Commonwealth of
Australia, [2010] HCA 41; Amuur v. France, 1996-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 1.
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tion long enough to develop any meaningful connection to it.127 However,
the "jurisdiction" or "mutuality of obligation" 128 argument, which believes
that if a state has authority (i.e. legal power) over a person then that person
should correlatively hold certain legal rights to protect her from that state's
power, applies to any person subordinated by that power, no matter what
her legal status in that country is, and the length of her stay in it.
To conclude on this point, which might, in the context of this article,
relate to airport detainees, I will argue that an alien has an independent right
to freedom of speech (i.e. not dependent on the right of her would-be listeners) from the moment she sets foot in the territory of the country of destination. 129 A country which is disturbed by the idea of yielding such a right to
foreigners, is free to use the well-recognized non-entrde method of visa requirement and airline companies responsibility for visa inspection in the
country of origin, 130 with its limitations (smuggling) and costs (e.g. foreign
affairs concerns and disruption of incoming tourism).
So far, we discussed the first axis, which revolves around the foreigner. The "inside/ outside country of destination" dichotomy is irrelevant,
after all, to citizens who wish to exercise their constitutional rights, as they
are free to enter their own country, 131 where they could exercise their rights,
whatever they are. The second axis, in contrast, relates both to the citizen
and the foreigner who engage, or wish to engage, in a conversation in the
citizen's country.
Since freedom of speech protects, among other things, open communication, and as communication involves at least two persons (the speaker and
the listener, who might constantly change roles), both sides could invoke
their putative right to freedom of speech against a governmental curtailment
of it. Indeed, freedom of speech includes the right to listen to someone
127. Bosniak, supra note 123, at 405-06.
128. NEUMAN, supra note 2, at 97-117.
129. However, given the fact that some of the rationales (i.e. the attachment one)
for bestowing that right on "physically present" aliens do not stand for short term visitors, such aliens' right to freedom of speech could be more easily overridden by a
compelling governmental interest, as compared to the right of an alien who has been
long term resident in the country. Yet, the right is accorded to the short-term visitor as
well, and a compelling governmental interest must be shown in order to override it, in
the least restrictive manner.
130. See, e.g., Hathaway & Gammeltoft-Hansen, Non-Refoulement in a World of
Cooperative Deterrence, 53 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 235, at 244-245 (2015).

131. Article 12(4) to ICCPR. For Israeli law, see Article 6(b) to Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty. For American law, see Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 US
53, 67 (2001): "Congress is well within its authority in refusing .... to commit this
country to embracing a child as a citizen entitled as of birth to the full protection of the
" (emphasis added).
United States, to the absolute right to enter its borders .....
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else's monologue and the right to gather information. 132 This insight is especially relevant when the speaker is a foreigner, wishing to enter another
country for the purpose of communicating with a listener, who is a citizen
of that country. While the foreigner cannot - as explained above - claim
a right to enter that country, regardless of her wish to express herself there
(neither by most countries' domestic constitutional law nor by international
human rights law), the local citizen can invoke her own right to listen to the
foreigner, under the auspices of the right to freedom of speech, as a reason
to allow the foreigner in. 133 To complicate things, I will add that the citizenry, and not only a particular citizen, might also have a collective right
that the government would not suppress speech based on its political content, as part of its collective right to self-governance. I will elaborate on this
point shortly.
Consider the case of Mandel: American would-be listeners, such as
Stanford University, asked the Federal government to let Mandel in, so that
they, not Mandel, could exercise their right to free speech, by listening to
him. The American Supreme Court indeed acknowledged that the American
respondents' constitutional right to freedom of speech was restrained and
therefore found they had standing. It further rejected the Government's
stance that the Court owed absolute deference to the Executive in visa denial cases, even when the denial supposedly violates the constitutional
132. See, e.g., in Israel, HCJ 243/62 Israel Movie Studios Ltd. v. Greg, 16 PD
2407, 2414-2415 (1962).
133. What about the citizen's right to speak before the foreigner in the citizen's
own country? In other words, can a citizen-speaker demand the entry of a foreignerlistener to her country, in the name of her (the citizen's) right to freedom of speech? For
example, can a university invoke its right to freedom of speech in order to admit a
foreigner into the country as an audience member, rather than as a speaker in a conference that it arranges? Here are some preliminary thoughts on this matter. First, most
often there is no real dichotomy between the speaker and the listener of a conversation,
as they constantly change roles. So the question becomes limited to rare cases in which
the foreigner is a "pure" listener. In these rare cases, the foreigner who is out of the
country cannot invoke her own right "to listen" (and enter the foreign country for that
sake), and the question becomes, as mentioned: can the local speaker claim a right to
speak face-to-face before a foreigner, hence justifying the entry of the foreigner for that
cause. I think the right could potentially be invoked; however, it might not be strong
enough to overcome governmental interests, compared to the right to listen to a foreigner. The question is what is the value of "purely" speaking in front of a foreigner that
justifies her entry into the country, if there are governmental interests against it. There
could be cases in which speaking before an audience of aliens carries special value: for
example, when the mere presence of the foreigner-listener in the foreign country carries
a symbolic (expressive) value or when the main aim of the citizen-speaker in her speech
is to target or influence the foreigner-listener qua foreigner.
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rights of American citizens - such as prospective listeners, who wish to
listen to the foreigners. Yet, the Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny
standard that it regularly applies when reviewing governmental acts that
infringe on citizens' freedom of speech. Instead, it used the "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard of review - without explaining its source.13 4
As mentioned above, years later - in the Trump v. Hawaii case - the
Court agreed, based on the Government's own accession, to use the only
slightly broader rational basis standard.
On its face, one could think of reasons to advocate for a more limited
standard of review in the discussed type of governmental action - i.e.,
barring the entry of foreign speakers despite its effect on would-be local
"listeners" - in the name of immigration control. In Mandel, Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority, engaged with this matter. He wrote:
Were we to endorse the proposition that governmental power to
withhold a waiver must yield whenever a bona fide claim is made
that American citizens wish to meet and talk with an alien excludable
under §212(a)(28), one of two unsatisfactory results would necessarily ensue. Either every claim would prevail, in which case the plenary discretionary authority Congress granted the Executive becomes
a nullity, or courts in each case would be required to weigh the
strength of the audience's interest against that of the Government in
refusing a waiver to the particular alien applicant, according to some
as yet undetermined standard. The dangers and the undesirability of
making that determination on the basis of factors such as the size of
the audience or the probity of the speaker's ideas are obvious. Indeed,
it is for precisely this reason that the waiver decision has, properly,
been placed in the hands of the Executive."

Justice Marshall, in his dissent, responded as follows:
I do not mean to suggest that, simply because some Americans
wish to hear an alien speak, they can automatically compel even his
temporary admission to our country. Government may prohibit aliens
from even temporary admission if exclusion is necessary to protect a
compelling governmental interest. Actual threats to the national security, public health needs, and genuine requirements of law enforcement are the most apparent interests that would surely be compelling.
But, in Dr. Mandel's case, the Government has, and claims, no such
compelling interest. Mandel's visit was to be temporary. His "ineligibility" for a visa was based solely on §212(a)(28). The only govern134. As Justice Marshall wrote in his dissent: "No citation is given for this kind of
unprecedented deference to the Executive, nor can I imagine (nor am I told) the slight-

est justification for such a rule." Kleindienstv. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 777-78 (1972).
135. Id. at 768-69.
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mental interest embodied in that section is the Government's desire to
keep certain ideas out of circulation in this country. This is hardly a
compelling governmental interest. Section (a)(28) may not be the basis for excluding an alien when Americans wish to hear him. Without
any claim that Mandel "live" is an actual threat to this country, there
is no difference between excluding Mandel because of his ideas and
keeping his books out because of their ideas. Neither is permitted. 136

With all due respect, Justice Marshall's minority opinion seems to be
sounder; and I could therefore only hope that Israeli Courts, becoming more
and more engaged these days in this matter of ideological exclusion of foreigners, would endorse his - rather than Justice Blackmun's - view. Justice Blackmun warns that the application of the strict standard of review,
regularly applied in First Amendment cases, would lead to a disastrous outcome, in which either the Executive loses its authority over immigration
altogether, or that the Executive and the Court are forced to delve into the
impossible task of assessing the value and importance of the speech. Yet the
first scenario is unfounded, and the second ignores decades of judicial balancing between the right to free speech and compelling governmental interests. Let me explain.

-

Regarding the loss of the Executive's authority over immigration: first,
the authority of the Executive in a democratic society - or, more precisely,
the discretionary exercise of such authority - indeed becomes more limited when it collides with a constitutional right of a person, and specifically
freedom of speech. This is true of any authority, including the authority
over public safety, public order and public health - just to name a few
and the authority over immigration is no different.
Second, as Justice Blackmun correctly observed, the tension between
immigration control and free speech rights arises when a citizen makes a
bonafide claim that she wishes to engage in a discussion with a foreigner. It
is the Executive's job to decide whether a claim is bonafide or not, and the
Judiciary seldom interferes with the fact-finding process and outcome of the
Executive in constitutional litigation. Just as immigration authorities deal
with sham marriages, between a citizen and an alien, so they can and should
deal with sham dialogues. And just as the real risk of sham marriages does
not preclude family reunification, so the risk of false-conferences, for example, should not lead to the disregard of the authentic wish of decent citizens
to engage in a discourse with foreign speakers. Moreover, there is no reason
to expect a scenario in which countless unwanted immigrants flood the
streets of the U.S (or Israel) by conspiring with local citizens who deceive

136. Id. at 783-84.
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the immigration authorities that they intend to engage in discourse with
them.
Third, the right to listen and engage in conversation, as most human
rights, in not absolute. If immigration control is a compelling governmental
interest, and indeed I think it is, under current international legal order, then
it could - in particular circumstances - override the constitutional right
of the local "listeners." This leads me to respond to Justice Blackmun's
second concern, that balancing between the constitutional right and the governmental compelling interest would inevitably result in the government's
taking into considerations "factors such as the size of the audience or the
probity of the speaker's ideas." Justice Blackmun, however, ignores the fact
that courts already engage in the craft of balancing when, for example, freedom of speech interferes with public safety, public order or other governmental compelling interest, or when it collides with someone else's
constitutional right (e.g. her right to privacy or freedom of movement).
Courts developed rules for the balancing of interests in such cases, and an
expertise in implementing them. They established, for example, a different
level of protection for different types of speech (political, artistic and commercial). 137 They also adopted different tests for balancing between the
competing interests (e.g., the "clear and present danger" test in enticement
cases).138 Of course, there are hard cases and borderline cases, but the legal
rules and precedents already exist, and courts and the Executive have
gained decades of judicial experience in the art of balancing, in both the
United States and Israel. There is no reason that things would be different
when the governmental interest is immigration control.
Take, for example, an alien who wishes to enter the country in order to
attend a conference. Can the Executive refuse to grant her a visa for the sole
reason that the conference is expected to be critical of the government? I
would answer in an emphatic "no." This seem to follow even from Mandel,
as the wish to suppress political criticism is not a "facially legitimate" reason for refusing entry of foreigners, and this was the ruling of Judge Baron
in the Alqasem case discussed below. 139 Even if foreigner herself has no
right to enter, the local audience has a right to listen to this criticism, as
discussed above in detail. As ruled in Police Departmentv. Mosley, "above
137. See, e.g., HCJ 5239/11 Uri Avnery et al v. The Knesset et al., 71 (Apr. 15,
2015), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew); Virginia State Pharmacy

Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 US 748, 764 (1976) (overruling
Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) and holding that "[g]eneralizing, society
also may have a strong interest in the free flow of commercial information.").

138. See, e.g., Brandenburgv. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (United States); 73/53
"Kol Haam" v. Minister of Interior, 7 P.O. 871 (1953) (Isr.).
139. Supra note 14.
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all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its
content." 14 0 Indeed, "viewpoint discrimination"1 4 1 is an unconstitutional infringement of freedom of speech. Just as the government cannot block a
foreign internet site or ban the import of a book based solely on its content,
with very few exceptions, so it cannot ban the entry of a foreigner just
because of what idea she might express while in the country. After all, one
of the rationales of freedom of speech is fostering public deliberation on
political matters, as a pre-requisite for self-governance.142 Banning the antigovernmental foreigner is, therefore, an infringement of the citizenry's right
to be exposed, eagerly or not, to a relevant and not necessarily valid
opinion.
Now, consider that the alien who came to attend the conference wishes
to extend the three months entry visa, that she - like most visitors to Israel
- got upon entering the country, so that she could become more involved
in her political activism in Israel. If the government refuses to renew her
visa due to the concern that longer periods of stay might lead to a settlement
of the foreigner in the country, which the state wishes to prevent, then this
is supposedly a compelling governmental interest which would apply to the
"political" immigrant as well. To legally compel the government to prolong
her visa, she and her local allies would have to establish that the freedom of
speech concerns, associated with her prolonged stay, outweigh the compelling governmental interest in immigration control, and that therefore there is
a justification to give her a "special treatment" concerning the length of
stay. This argument would probably not be an easy one to make. Armed
with such theoretical and doctrinal background, let us now analyze the three
Israeli cases described above.
III.

IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION IN ISRAEL: THREE CASE STUDIES

Israeli jurisprudence on immigration, like its American counterpart,
underlines the notion of SEP. Countless court decisions stressed that the
Israeli government, and the Minister of Interior in particular, hold very
broad discretionary power in matters of immigration.14 3 However, Israeli
Courts also stressed that broad power in the realm of immigration does not
140. Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); for a similar ruling in

Israel see CA 751/10 Ploni v. Dayan, 38 (Feb. 8, 2012), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew).
141. Kent Greenawalt, O'Er the Land of the Free: Flag Burning as Speech, 37

UCLA L. REv. 925, 931-32 (1990).
142. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 24-28 (1960).
143. See, e.g., HCJ 758/88 Kendall v. Ministerof Interior, 46(4) PD 505 (1992).
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mean absolute power. 144 Like in the U.S., Israeli precedents hold that constitutional considerations may, at times, support applications for entry and
continued stay of aliens in the country, either based on the aliens' independent constitutional rights (at least in cases of continued stay), 14 or based on
citizens' constitutional rights, which indirectly enable entry or continued
stay of "piggybacking" aliens. However, and despite the Levy case mentioned above,14 6 Israeli Knesset and Courts, as will be discussed below, do
not always recognize the effect which Israelis' freedom of expression bears
on allowing the entry or continued stay of aliens with whom they dialogue,
and definitely overlook the independent right of aliens themselves to freedom of speech in Israel (in cases in which the alien is already in the country). To demonstrate this contention, I will analyze three case studies from
the last decade.
The first discussed case below, that of a Messianic Jew who was deported for holding a sign in support of "Jews for Jesus," is an intriguing and
- I will argue - disturbing case, in which the freedom of speech perspective, including the right of Israeli citizens to interact with the foreign Messianic Jew, was completely absent from the judicial analysis of all three
instances adjudicating the case.
The second case study is that of the Israeli-Palestinian Bereaved Families for Peace, which petitioned the High Court of Justice in 2018, and once
again in 2019, against the Ministry of Defense's decision to deny entry of
Palestinian bereaved families to enter Israel in order to participate in an
alternative Memorial Day ceremony annually held in Tel Aviv, side by side
with the Israeli bereaved families. In both its 2018 and 2019 decisions, I
will argue, the Court correctly allowed the Palestinian bereaved families
into the country. Yet, most of the Court's reasoning in 2018 revolved
around administrative law considerations of "reasonableness," while ignoring the bereaved families' joint expressive activity and the constitutional
defense it is entitled to. This might be the reason that the Ministry of Defense decided again to prevent entry of the Palestinian bereaved families a
year later. In the second ruling, the Court finally used clear freedom of
expression reasoning and terminology.
Finally, I will discuss the 2017 Anti-BDS immigration law, and the
litigation that it generated so far. Here, too, I will contend, the "right to
listen" of Israelis was not given the full normative power that is due.
144. AdminA 1038/08 State of Israel v. Javitz, (Aug 11, 2009), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew), at 21.

145. See, e.g., HCJ 11437/05 Kav LaOved v. The Ministry of Interior, (Apr. 13,
2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew).
146. Supra note 13.
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The Messianic Jew Case

Barry Martin Lawrence Barnett is a UK national born in 1963, and a
self-identified Messianic Jew. He entered Israel with a three-month B/2
"tourist" visa in November 2013. Such a visa is issued to a person who
"wishes to enter Israel for a visit or any other purpose, which requires only
a short sojourn in Israel, provided that it is not for the purpose of work,
whether for remuneration or not."1 4 7
Two weeks later (and several days before his flight back to the UK
was scheduled for) Barnett was inspected in a cross-road in Southern Israel
holding a sign which said: "Yeshu-Yeshua-Yeshuah," a Hebrew slogan
used by Messianic Jews in Israel, which emphasized the Hebrew origin of
the name of Jesus, and its denotation to salvation, and handing out leaflets.
Three Israelis took part in the same activity with Barnett.
What caused the immigration inspectors to arrive to the place and
check Barnett's papers, is unclear. Two inspectors wrote "activity reports" 148 concerning Barnett's initial hold up, but none disclosed what
brought them to the scene to begin with. Inspector Assaf wrote that the
inspection team, consisting of four inspectors, "observed two couples standing with 'Yeshu-Yeshua-Yeshuah' placards," but did not elaborate if they
noticed the four in a routine or haphazard drive by, or if they came there
based on a specific call. Inspector Azran wrote that the inspection was a
"proactive activity," but did not elaborate on the source and reason for this
proactivity. The doubt is being raised here since instances of "ratting" to the
authorities on activities of Messianic Jews - a highly unpopular group in

147. Article 5 to the Entry to Israel Regulations, 1974.

148. On file with author.
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is a well-documented phe-

nomenon in Israel. 15 0

149. See, e.g., Pauline Kollontai, Messianic Jews and Jewish Identity, 3 J.
ERN JEWISH STUDIES

MOD-

195, 201-213 (2004) (opposition to Messianic Jews from within

the Jewish communities and Israel and the U.S, documenting also violent attacks
against Messianic Jewish synagogues by other Jews); Temar Zieve, Will Israel Ever
Accept Messianic Jews?, JERUSALEM POST (16 Dec. 2017), https://www.jpost.com/
Israel-News/Diaspora-Affairs-Will-Israel-ever-accept-Messianic-Jews-518129. The Supreme Court ruled in HCJ 265/87 Beresford v. Minister of Interior, 43(4) PD 793
(1987) that Messianic Jews, even if Jewish under Halacha (Jewish Law) are not entitled
to naturalization under the Law of Return. See also Aaron R. Petty, The Concept of
Religion in the Supreme Court of Israel, 26 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 211, 249-54 (review
of the opinions delivered by Deputy President of the Supreme Court, Judge Elon, and
by Judge Barak); Yaacov Ben-Shemesh, The Law and the Shaping ofNationalMemory:
The Case of Messianic Jews, 10 ALEI MISHPAT 177 (2012) (Isr.) (examining Deputy
President Elon's opinion thoroughly and claiming that Elon's grasp on Judaism is subjective and contingent). See also, e.g., HCJ 8735/06 Comforti v. Council of the Chief

Rabbinate of Israel, Tak-SC 2009(2) 4347 (holding that the Council of the Chief
Rabbinate of Israel was wrong to take into consideration the fact that the appellant is a
Messianic Jew, thus refusing to grant her bakery a Kashrut certification); File No. 3060/
02 Administrative Court (Jer), David Stern v. PalestinePostLtd. (Nov. 11, 2003), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (A 2:1 holding that the respondent, the
sole Israeli daily newspaper being published in English at that time, may discriminate
against Messianic Jews and refrain from publishing ads concerning them); File No.
16166-01-11 Administrative Court (Jer), Danur v. Ministry of Interior (Jan. 8, 2012),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (holding that the Ministry of Interior, in denying her application for citizenship, was wrong to take into consideration the
fact that the applicant, who married an Israeli citizen, is a Messianic Jew); File No.
5716-11-10 Administrative Court (Jer), Henson et al. v. Ministry of Interior (June 23,
2011), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (holding that the respondent
was wrong to take into consideration a loosely based report regarding the applicants'
alleged missionary activity while denying their request for a Clergy visa); File No.

11624-12-15 Hodous et al. v. Vasilio events Ltd. (Feb. 1, 2017), Nevo Legal Database
(by subscription, in Hebrew) (holding of damages against the owner of a wedding
venue who refused to service a Messianic couple); File No. 2979-17 Court of Appeals
of The Entry into Israel Law, 1952, Van der Valt v. Population and Immigration Authority (Dec. 5, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (holding that
the Ministry of Interior mustn't decline appellants' request for a tourist permit solely
because of the fact that they are Messianic Jews who have organized tours in Israel for
over 20 years).
150. "Yad L'Achim," a non-governmental organization, operates a hotline in
which people can notify the organization of missionary activities all around the country.
The organization's background and mission, as described in its website is as follows:
"Yad L'Achim was established in 1950 to help new immigrants adjust to the newly
born country and to help them find a suitable religious framework. It is a non-profit
organization with no political affiliation. Over the years, its attention has turned to more
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Inspector Assaf's report describes the placards, that the four (two Israeli men, one Israeli woman and Barnett) were holding, their dismay with
the inspectors' intervention in their protest, and Barnett's agreement to go
with the inspectors to the immigration station, after his initial refusal. He
ends his report with the words: "It should be noted that the foreigner [Barnett] is a B/2 tourist who violated his visa by handing out flyers and holding
signs intended for religious persuasion (Jesus)."
Inspector Azran wrote in her report that Barnett was also wearing a Tshirt with a "Jews for Jesus" slogan, and handed out a leaflet titled "Jesus
saved me," a copy of which she attached to her activity report. She wrote:
"I asked [Barnett] what was the purpose of his visit in Israel and he replied
that he came on vacation and for volunteering for the non-profit organization for whom he held the signs.. . . he further argued that he does not get
any money for it."
In the station, Barnett underwent what was supposed to be a hearing
regarding MOI's intention to revoke his visa 51 The "hearing" form states
the following (syntax and punctuation errors in origin; author's translation):
Elaboration of facts: B/2 tourist engaged in messianic activity.

Content of the hearing: On 20/11/13 in Tel Sheva junction the
aforementioned held signs in which it was stated who wants to join
the faith of Jesus. Also handed out flyers to bypassers.
Decision: Revocation of B/2 visa.

Foreigner's response to revocation of his visa: I have nothing to
say.

In another form, "Announcement of visa revocation," issued apparently following the "hearing," the given reason for the visa revocation is

complex problems, including how to counter the missionary threat . . . . Fighting the
missionaries, who have millions of dollars a year at their disposal, has long been one
of Yad L'Achim's top priorities." http://yadlachim.org/?CategoryID=188. It operates a
"counter missionary department," the activities of which is described as follows: "We
fight the missionaries in a variety of ways, some of which, due to their sensitive nature,
can't be described in detail. One of our most important functions is to track the activities of missionaries and respond to them in appropriate ways." http://yadlachim.org/

?CategoryID=196&ArticleID=554
151. Actually, it was not much of a hearing, as Barnett was asked to respond after,
rather than before the decision to revoke the visa was taken.
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"messianic activity." Another form, a deportation order, states that Barnett
is barred from entering Israel for a period of ten years.1 12
Following the "hearing" regarding his visa revocation, Barnett underwent a second hearing, this time regarding his possible detention until deportation. In this hearing he was asked why he held the signs, and replied:
"I believe that Jesus is the Messiah, and wish to join people in." At the end
of the hearing the MOI's decision is "to keep [Barnett] in custody until
deportation - messianic activity." Because of his detention, Barnett missed
the pre-scheduled flight back to the UK, that he purchased in advance.
The custody tribunal, which heard Barnett's case four days later,15
wrote that the Ministry of Interior revoked Barnett's visa "after it found that
he was engaged in missionary activity - spreading the ideas of Messianic
Jews." However, in the oral hearing before the tribunal, the MOI gave for
the first time an additional reason for the visa revocation and deportation
order: Barnett was not a tourist, but rather worked or volunteered for a
nonprofit organization (whose flyers he handed out) without obtaining the
proper visa. 1 4 Barnett violated, MOI claimed, Article 5(d) of the Entrance
to Israel Regulations, which provides that "a person wishing to enter Israel
in order to temporarily work without remuneration would apply for a visa
and a B/4 type of a visit permit (volunteer)." Barnett, it should be recalled,
held a B/2 (tourist) rather than a B/4 (volunteer) visa when he entered the
country.
Barnett's lawyer argued before the custody tribunal that Barnett was
merely exercising his right to freedom of expression, protected by the
United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) Global Code of
Ethics for Tourism, 155 which Israel has signed. 156 The judge disregarded the
argument. He ruled that "without delving into the criminal implication of
152. There is a default rule of ten-year ban on re-entry of a person who was deported from Israel. See section B.2.1 to MOI procedure 5.4.0001 on issuing of B/2
(Visitor) visas.

153. File No. 1486185 Immigration Detention Review Tribunal (Give'on) (Nov.
24, 2013).
154. As mentioned above, inspector Azran did write in her activity report that
Barnett mentioned volunteering as one of his reasons for the visit, and the matter was
also mentioned in Barnett's pre-detention hearing. However, this matter was NOT mentioned as a reason for the visa revocation, deportation and detention.
155. http://cf.cdn.unwto.org/sites/all/files/docpdf/gcetbrochureglobalcodeen.pdf
156. The code, however, is not a legally binding instrument. A better reference
would, therefore, be to Article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (right to freedom of expression), in conjunction with Article 2(1) ("Each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals
within its territory.").
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the detainee's alleged activities" he would release Barnett from custody, as
he was convinced that Barnett would leave Israel on his own. He set a bail,
ordered Barnett to leave the country within ten days, and clarified that Barnett "would not engage in prohibited missionary activity until he leaved
Israel." It should be noted, that Israeli law does not prohibit persuading a
person to proselytize, as long as the person is an adult, and the persuasion
does not involve any financial or material return. 157 It was never argued that
Barnett did either of the two.
After Barnett left Israel, he filed a petition with the Administrative
Court to cancel the MOI ten years reentry ban. MOI's principal reasoning
now was that Barnett volunteered for a non-profit, and therefore should
have obtained a volunteer (B/4) visa, and not a tourist (B/2) visa. Barnett's
lawyer objected to this shift in reasoning, and relied on Supreme Court
precedents, holding that Courts would be suspicious towards a new reasoning, which the Executive did not give at the time of the decision (i.e. prior
to litigation).158
The Administrative Court overlooked MOI's shifting in arguments. It
stated that in the MOI pre-detention hearing, Barnett said that he entered
Israel "in order to persuade people to join the faith and support of Jesus,"
but he admitted that in the border control of Ben Gurion airport he declared
that he came on a vacation; and that he further admitted in the hearing that
his accommodation in Israel was covered by the NGO whose flyers he disseminated. "Under these circumstances," the judge concluded, "there is a
factual basis for the respondent's finding that the petitioner indeed worked
- either for free or for remuneration, in opposition to his declaration in the
border that he came on vacation." 15 9 Hence, the petition was denied. An
appeal to the Supreme Court of Israel was dismissed for the same reason.
Also, in the meantime, the MOI has allowed Barnett to re-enter the country
after depositing money as a guarantee to leaving the country on time and
with a declaration that he would not engage in prohibited proselytization, a
fact that made the original deportation order more proportionate in the
Court's view. 160

As I see things, we have here a case of a foreigner who engaged in an
expressive activity with Israelis. His engagement was, first, with the three
157. Art. 174A, 368 Penal Law, 5737-1977.
158. HCJ 517/72, Snowerest (Israel) Ltd. v. Mayor of Bnei Brak 27(1) P.D.
632(1973). For a similar doctrine, as applied in the UK in deportation proceedings, see
Reg. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex parte Soblen [1963] 2 Q.B. 243, 302.
159. AdminC (Cr.) 11986-02-14 Barnett v. Populationand ImmigrationAuthority
et al. 4 (Apr. 20, 2014), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew).
160. AdminA 3919/14 Barnett v. Population and Immigration Authority et al. 4
(June 18, 2015), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew).
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Israelis he held up signs with, and with the "Jews for Jesus" Israeli branch,
with whom he grouped. Indeed, people often associate to advance shared
beliefs and programs, and the constitutional right of freedom of expression
protects such kind of activity. 161 Second, with the Israeli public: the ones he
handed out leaflets to (and possibly engaged in conversation with) and the
drivers who drove by and saw his sign in the Tel Sheva junction.
As Barnett was present in Israel at the time of his apprehension, and
not just wishing to enter the country from abroad, he himself had a protected right to freedom of speech, as a speaker, wishing to express himself
and influence the public debate on this religious matter in Israel.162 Moreover, Barnett held a valid tourist visa when he was engaging in the demonstration, a visa that the immigration authorities revoked thereafter.
According to a long-standing doctrine of Israeli administrative law,16 3 the
Executive must be more cautious in revoking a permit as compared to refusing to grant a permit to begin with, or refusing to renew one.
Apart from Barnett's own rights, there are also the rights of the other
Messianic Jews and citizens of Israel to associate with him, and engage
together in awareness raising and persuasion for their common belief. Of
special importance here is the fact the Messianic Jews are a religious minority, extremely unpopular in Israel. 164 Freedom of speech jurisprudence directs the authorities to protect and defend the views of unpopular groups
with special determination and decisiveness. 165 Additionally, there is the
right of Israeli "listeners" to see the signs, read the leaflets and be convinced (or not) by them.
The three instances that discussed Barnett's case were completely
blind to all these considerations. Somehow, the ordinarily highly applauded
principle of freedom of expression - of Barnett, of his fellow Israeli Messianic Jews, and of the Israeli public - was completely overlooked. None
of the judges of the three instances asked themselves, why did the immigration officers come to the remote Tel Sheva junction to begin with. could it
161. See in the U.S.: NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460
(1958).
162. See supra note 156 (on Article 19 of the ICCPR); supra notes 108-110 and
accompanying text (on Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty).

163. HCJ 113/52 Zacks v. Minister of Trade and Industry, 6(1) IsrSC 696, 700
(1952); HCJ 799/80 Shlalam v. Licensing Officer Pursuantto the FirearmsLaw, 36(1)

IsrSC 317, 327 (1981). In AdminA 7216/18 Lara Alqasem v. Immigrationand Population Authority, para. 17 (Oct. 18, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) Judge Hendel gave a restrictive application to this doctrine in matters of entry
visas.
164. See supra note 149.

165. Hague v. Comm. For Ind. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
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be religious profiling 166 - or even worse: religious harassment?; why did
they question and apprehend him despite the fact that he showed them a
valid tourist visa?; and why did the Ministry of Interior not mention the "B/
4 (volunteer) vs. B/2 (tourist) visa" argument in the early correspondence it
had with Barnett's lawyer? Instead of dealing with these weighty questions,
the court either clung to the formalistic matter of the type of visa Barnett
held; 167 or even worse, unfoundedly and erroneously insinuated 168 that Barnett's expression was "missionary" and therefore illegal-an insinuation
that by itself buttresses the claim of harassment of Messianic Jews in Israel.
In my opinion, the circumstances surrounding Barnett's visa revocation, detention and deportation are alarming. The fact that the judicial system did not pay any attention to the arguments that Barnett's lawyer made
- i.e. that his client was deported due to his views - is disturbing. The
evidence supports Barnett's argument, but all three instances refused to examine it, and to acknowledge that this seems to be a clear case of religious
harassment.
Even under the Mandelian extremely low (and highly criticized) standard of review, the acts of the authorities in the Barnett case, with their
transgression on freedom of speech, seem to be unconstitutional. The reason given by the Israeli authorities for deporting Barnett, just like the reasons given by the American authorities for refusing the entry of Mandel,
was visa violation. This could very well be a "facially legitimate" reason, as
the Mandel court indeed ruled. However, the full Mandeliantest talks about
"a facially legitimate and bona fide reason." Can the authorities, which ini166. File No. 11387-09-14 Regional Labor Court (TA), State of IsraelPopulation
and ImmigrationAuthority v. Erez Rubinstein (Feb. 4, 2017), Nevo Legal Database (by

subscription, in Hebrew) (appeal pending on File No. 42453-03-17 National Labor

-

Court (Jerusalem), State ofIsrael Populationand ImmigrationAuthority v. Erez Rubinstein) (holding that surveilling a woman just because of her "Asian appearance" is illegal, and therefore may not be used as evidence in trial against her employer for illegal
employment).
167. Even if it were true that Barnett violated the conditions of his tourist visa by
volunteering for a religious non-profit, the court could have inquired whether it was a
bona fide mistake on Barnett's part, to be pardoned rather than punished. What exactly
a tourist can do under a B/2 visa in Israel is indeed unclear, and therefore such visa
holders are prone to mistakenly interpret it. For example, while article 5 to the Entry to
Israel Regulation, 1974, provides that a B/2 visa is for "a short sojourn in Israel, for
purposes other than work," when I asked the MOI - under the Freedom of Information
Act - what type of visa should a person, who comes to do business in Israel, obtain
the answer was a B/2 visa (letter of Ms. Davidian to author dated Aug. 10, 2015).
168. The Custody Tribunal explicitly mentioned this, supra note 153. During the
litigation before the Supreme Court, MOI finally agreed to let Barnet re-enter Israel, but
asked him to sign an obligation that he would not engage in illegal proselytization.

122

BUFFALO HUMAN

RIGHTS

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

-

tially mentioned "Messianic activity" as the reason for Barnett's visa revocation, and only later introduced the "volunteering tourist" argument, be
considered to act in good faith? I believe the evidence runs against such a
conclusion.
If there is any doubt whether Barnett could survive the Mandel test,
this doubt dissipates when we turn to the rational basis test, endorsed in
Trump v. Hawaii. According to this test, the Court would not simply take
the government's word for what was its reason for the visa refusal (here
revocation), but would roll up its sleeves and delve into the nasty work of
looking into actual evidence. If the Barnett court would have taken a moment to read the "activity report" of inspector Assaf, the protocol of the visa
revocation hearing, the statement of visa revocation or the other documents
described in detail above, it would have realized, I believe, that the visa
violation was nothing more than a pretext for what was patently religious
harassment, speech suppression and misuse of governmental power. Barnett's apprehension did not promote any important or legal interest; it was
pure silencing of an unpopular view.
Obviously, a strict scrutiny test - the test I advocate for, following
Justice Marshall's dissent in Mandel and Justice Sotomayor's dissent in
Trump v. Hawaii - would have led to granting Barnett's motion. According to this test, the court investigates if there is a compelling governmental
interest that would outweigh the right to freedom of speech. Here, the right
can be claimed by several entities (Barnett, his fellow Messianic Jews, the
Israeli public), and the governmental interest - to ensure that tourists do not
do volunteer work during their stay - is not so compelling. If it was the real
reason for the deportation to begin with, and, moreover, if Barnett had a
bona fide mistake regarding his visa conditions, a matter that was not seriously considered. The decision of ten-year entry ban, therefore, seems
highly disproportionate. An interesting point to be noted is that while both
the Administrative Court and the Supreme Court rejected Barnett's petition
and appeal, respectively, they both related to the matter of proportionality,
highlighting the fact that Barnett would, in reality, be able to re-enter Israel
before the ten-year ban is over. 169 This referral might indicate that Israeli
169. The Administrative Court signed its decision with these words: "It was made
clear, that by the MOI's perspective, the petitioner will not face a complete ban on entry
to Israel, but for the next ten years will have to apply in a request to the MOI, if he
wishes to enter. This is a proportionate and reasonable decision, and the Court will not
intervene in it." AdminC (Cr.) 11986-02-14 Barnett v. Population and Immigration
Authority et al. 4 (Apr. 20, 2014), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew).
During the litigation before the Supreme Court, Barnett's request to re-enter Israel
was granted. The Supreme Court wrote: "The fact that the ban was softened by adding
the option for the appellant to apply for a Visa is sufficient for the determination that
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Courts are open to the idea of strict scrutiny in cases of foreigners' exclusion on ideological grounds.
B.

The Israeli-PalestinianBereaved Familiesfor Peace Case

The Memorial Day Law for the Fallen of Israel's Wars, enacted in
1963, provides that "[t]he fourth of Iyar will be the Memorial Day for
soldiers of the Israel Defense Forces who made the ultimate sacrifice in
order to assure the existence of the State of Israel, as well as those who fell
in the campaigns to create the State of Israel, to memorialize them and pay
tribute to their courage." 17 0 The law further provides that on Memorial Day
two minutes of silence will be observed throughout the entire country; flags
will be lowered to half-mast in all public buildings; and ceremonies, commemorations and public gatherings will take place.
For over a decade, an alternative memorial ceremony takes place in
Israel, at the exact date that the Memorial Day Law stipulates as the annual
day for commemorating the fallen. This alternative ceremony is organized
by "The Parents Circle - Families Forum (PCFF)," a joint Israeli-Palestinian non-profit organization of over 600 families, all of whom have lost an
immediate family member to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to the organization's website, "the PCFF has concluded that the
process of reconciliation between nations is a prerequisite to achieving a
sustainable peace. The organization thus utilizes all resources available in
education, public meetings and the media, to spread these ideas."17 1
In the PCFF alternative ceremony, bereaved Israeli families sit side by
side with bereaved Palestinian families, share their grief and aspiration for
peace. Representatives of the two peoples go on stage and read texts. The
message is one of solidarity and recognition that due to the ongoing conflict, both sides suffer. As years go by, more people attend the PCFF ceremony, taking place in Tel Aviv. In 2017, the year before the case came to
Court for the first time, the number of participants rose to 4000. Nevertheless, the event remains out of consensus in Israeli public.
Until 2018, the Civil Administration office of the Israeli Defense
Forces (IDF) allowed Palestinian bereaved families from the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) to attend the ceremony, by issuing them a short
the order does not prevent his entry in an absolute manner." AdminA 3919/14 Barnett
v. Populationand ImmigrationAuthority et al. 4 (June 18, 2015), Nevo Legal Database
(by subscription, in Hebrew).
170. Memorial Day Law for the Fallen of Israel's Wars Law, 1963-, https://
www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/MemorialDayLaw_eng.htm
171. See About PCFF, THE PARENTS CIRCLE http://theparentscircle.org/en/
about_eng/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2018).
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term permit into Israel, unless there was a security concern that allegedly
prevented it.172 In 2018, Minister of Defense Avigdor Liberman refused for
the first time to allow any of the Palestinians in for the purpose of attending
the alternative ceremony. He tweeted:
I decided to bar entry to Israel of . . . . Palestinians who were
invited to an Israeli-Palestinian "joint ceremony" to be held on the
evening of Memorial Day. I will not allow desecrating Memorial
Day. It is not a memorial ceremony but rather an exhibition of bad
taste and insensitivity, which hurts the bereaved families, who are
most dear to us. 17 3

In the formal refusal, which followed Liberman's tweet, the deputy
legal advisor of the Ministry of Defense wrote to PCFF that the State holds
broad discretion in deciding whether to allow foreigners into the country;
and that the alternative ceremony hurts the feelings of the general public in
Israel, specifically a significant portion of the bereaved Israeli families. Further, the ceremony could potentially be held outside of Israel, in a manner
that would not hurt the feelings of the general public as much. All these
arguments were repeated by the State before the High Court of Justice,
when PCFF and others petitioned against the Minister of Defense's decision. 17 4 The petitioners, on their part, argued that the decision to ban entry
of Palestinians to the ceremony infringes on the freedom of expression of
the organizers and the participants of the alternative ceremony, and their
right to commemorate their loved ones as they see fit. They further stressed
that the mutual ceremony intends to promote dialogue, reconciliation and
the bringing together of Jews and Palestinians.
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners and ordered the Minister of
Defense to issue temporary permits to 90 Palestinians - the same number
that was approved for that cause in a previous year - to enter Israel from
the OPT in order to attend the ceremony.
The Court reasoned as follows:

172. For IDF regulation on entry of Palestinian civilians into Israel see: Civil
Administration Office of the Israeli Defense Forces, Unclassified Permission Status for
the Entrance of Palestinians to Israel, for their Passage between Judea and Samaria and
the Gaza Strip, and Their Exit Abroad (2019) (in Hebrew), http://www.gisha.org/User
Files/File/LegalDocuments/procedures/general/50.pdf.

173. HCJ 2964/18 The Parents Circle -

Families Forum (PCFF)v. Minister of

Defense (Apr. 16, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew).
174. Id. An additional argument, according to which some of the Palestinian invitees are relatives of terrorists, who were killed while trying to execute their terrorist
attacks, was later withdrawn by the State's legal representatives, who apologized before
the Court for making this unfounded argument.
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We examined the Minister of Defense's stance in this case ...
and we conclude that the decision does not take into account the reality that was created throughout the years regarding issuance of permits for participation in the joint ceremony and the legitimate
expectations that were naturally formed among the joint ceremony
organizers following the previous policy. We also found that, when
executing his discretion, the Minister of Defense completely disregarded the considerations which relate to the feelings of the bereaved
families who wish to conduct the ceremony in the planned manner,
by Israelis and Palestinians jointly. Also absent from the Minister of
Defense's considerations are the feelings of the segment of Israeli
society which supports the existence of the ceremony and identifies
with its content and aims ....

The Minister of Defense's stance puts the entire weight on the bereaved families and the public which the joint ceremony hurts its feelings,
while completely overlooking the feelings of the bereaved families and the
public who wish to conduct the ceremony as it was conducted throughout
the years. Hence, the Minister's decision is unbalanced and unreasonable to
the extent that justifies our intervention. 17 5
In a subsequent paragraph the Court wrote that the petitioners' ideology, even if in dispute, is reconciliatory and non-defying, and stressed the
blessing embedded in a plurality of opinions and "the importance to allow
each person the freedom to choose his own path out of a recognition that
this is a vital and central element, which a democratic society in based
on." 176

The decision was handed down on the morning of April 17, 2018. At
that very evening the ceremony took place, after the Palestinian participants
were allowed in. According to media coverage, around 7000 people attended the ceremony, and several hundred protested against it nearby.
In this case, unlike in Barnett, the Palestinian petitioners 17 7 have yet to
enter Israeli territory. Hence, they themselves could not have invoked a
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. I am analyzing this case by legal norms applied by Israeli courts. Hence, I
overlook the political difficulty (some would say irony) of describing Palestinians as
"outsiders" who need a permit to enter a territory once part of the land they or their
ancestors used to inhabit. The Supreme Court of Israel did recently rule that Palestinians who had a permanent residence status (i.e. residents of East Jerusalem) should not
be easily stripped of that status, as they are not mere immigrants, by rather natives, who
were born in the area, and whose families inhabited the land for generations (HCJ 7803/
06 Abu Arfa v. Minister of Interior(13.9.2017), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription,
in Hebrew). However, this does not grant a right for a Palestinian from the OPT, who
was never granted residency status in Israel, to enter the country. Under international
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right to freedom of speech in Israel. However, the Israeli bereaved families
and the Israeli public wishing to attend the ceremony do have a right to
pursue a dialogue with them. Indeed, the mere standing of the bereaved
Israeli families side by side with the bereaved Palestinian families, holding
hands, mourning together, is highly expressive and political - even before
a word is uttered. The mere standing together, in Israel, during Memorial
Day, is an expressive conduct, a message. As the American Supreme Court
ruled, in deciding whether a particular conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into play, the court should
ask itself whether "an intent to convey a particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it."1 7 8 In the Bereaved Families case the
answers for both these questions is in the affirmative. Hence, the mere gathering of the families from both sides of the border deserves freedom of
expression protection. Obviously, the verbal messages conveyed in previous ceremonies, and expected to be conveyed in the 2018 one as well
messages of co-existence and peace between Israelis and Palestinians - are
also entitled to constitutional protection as political speech.
To justifiably curtail the Israeli citizens' freedom of speech, the Israeli
authorities must have proven a compelling governmental interest that would
outweigh it. The Minister's awkward "bad taste" argument is not even a
legitimate interest, let alone "compelling" one. The argument regarding the
fact that some, maybe most, Israeli bereaved families will be hurt and offended by the Israel-Palestinian gathering is also not a compelling interest,
since - as the Court correctly observed - it prefers protecting the feelings
of some bereaved families over the feelings and ideology of others. Moreover, according to Supreme Court precedents, only in the most extreme and
exceptional cases could negative feelings such as insult, sadness or fury,
however sincere, be considered a compelling interest, which overrides the
right to freedom of speech. 179 Hence, from a legal point of view, this was an
easy case, which the Court ruled correctly.
It should be noted, however, that while the Court indeed reached in
this 2018 decision the correct outcome, it is doubtful if the case was decided on free speech grounds. The Court did mention, towards the end of its

law of occupation, there is no right of the residents of the occupied territory to enter the
territory of the occupier.

178. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 404 (1989). The case was cited by the Israeli
District Court in CrimA 5035/09 Nawi v. State of Israel (14.4.2010), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew).
179. See, e.g.,

HCJ 316/03

al, 58(1) PD 249, 283 (2003)

Mohammed Bakri et al v. Film Review Commission et
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decision, the importance of plurality of ideas in a democratic regime. However, most of its reasoning revolved around the fact that the Minister of
Defense did not give any weight to the feelings of the bereaved families
who were part of the Israeli-Palestinian forum, hence giving disproportionate (as a matter of fact, absolute) weight to that of the other families. As
such, it is "merely" a ruling of unreasonableness under administrative law.
Violation of the petitioners' reliance interest, another ground in administrative rather than constitutional law, was also mentioned by the Court.
This might very well be the reason that in the following year the Minister of Defense (this time not Liberman, but rather Prime Minister himself,
who acted as Minister of Defense simultaneously) decided againto ban the
entry of the Palestinian bereaved families to the 2019 ceremony. The application for their entry was this time refused in a succinct sentence: "Hello.
The application is denied since there is a closure on Memorial Day eve." A
petition was again submitted to the High Court of Justice, which this time
used a clear freedom of expression terminology and reasoning to accept the
petition and order the Minister to issue entry permits to the Palestinian families. The Court rejected the Minister's argument that the decision was
based on security reasons. Judge Amit wrote in his leading opinion: "There
are ninety-nine ways for memorialization. There are ninety-nine ways to
express grief. Here lies the core of freedom of expression, of personal autonomy, the one that grants each person the opportunity to wrote and to
design his own life story as he sees fit 180" Judge Barak-Erez added:
This petition is not only about Israel's admission regime and the
rules which apply to judicial review thereof, but rather about a question which bears clear aspects of protecting freedom of speech, on
which strict standards apply. As far as the ceremony's organizers are
concerned, the identity of the ceremony's participants is part of the
message which they wish to convey. The decision which was made
[by the Minister of Defense] has ramification on the conveyance of
the message in an area which is at the core of freedom of speech
protection - matters of disagreement in the public sphere. Hence, the
respondents had to take this matter into account, but their response
mentioned nothing of it. As judges, our role is to ensure that freedom
of speech in the Israeli society, particularly in matters of dispute, is

well kept.
To conclude, the 2019 decision, unlike the 2018 one, used unequivocal
constitutional reasoning, which is called for in freedom of expression cases.
180. HCJ 3052/19 Fighting for Pease Ltd. And The Parents Circle - Families
Forum (PCFF)v. Ministerof Defense 7 (May 6, 2019), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew).
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Specifically, Justice Barak Erez, in her concurring opinion, echoed the ruling of the U.S. District Court in the American Arab Anti-Discrimination
Committee case,181 and made clear, that even when the Israeli Government

(there - the American Congress) exercises its power at the core of immigration regime (in the Israeli case - the power of non-admission; in the American case - the power of deportation), it must use it within constitutional
boundaries, including the limit on freedom of speech violation.18 2 Accordingly, the 2019 decision applied strict scrutiny and rigorous judicial review.
After this second decision, it would be much harder for the Government to
ignore the Court's precedent, and one could anticipate (and hope) that it
would not attempt to hinder future alternative Memorial Day ceremonies as
it attempted to in 2018 and 2019.
C.

The Anti-BDS Legislation

For a decade at least, the Israeli Knesset and Government have sought
ways to suppress the support of boycott against Israel, manifestations of
which became more common around the world.183 The first measure taken
was the enactment of the Law for Prevention of Damage to the State of
Israel through Boycott of 2011, also known as the Boycott Law. 184 The
Boycott Law defines "a boycott against the State of Israel" as "deliberately
avoiding economic, cultural or academic ties with another person or body
solely because of their affinity with the State of Israel, one of its institutions
or an area under its control, in such a way that may cause economic, cultural or academic damage." 185 It further considers that knowingly publishing an item which carries a reasonable probability that it will lead to a
boycott, is a civil wrong. 186 Article 3 of the Law also limits the participation
in tenders of any person or organization who published a call for a boycott

181. Supra note 64.
182. See Bosniak, supra note 104 at 73.
183. The leading entity for the advancement of international boycott against Israel
is the BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) movement. BDS MOVEMENT, https://
bdsmovement.net (last visited Oct. 31, 2018). While Israel's struggle against boycott
initiatives is not confined to the BDS movement alone, the BDS movement has become
the main target of criticism and anti-boycott struggle by Israeli politicians and media.
Hence, I title the legislation discussed below "the anti-BDS Legislation."
184. Law for Prevention of Damage to the State of Israel through Boycott, 5771-

2011, SH No. 2304 p. 972.
185. Id. at § 1.
186. Id. at § 2.
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or is committed to take part in one, 187 while Article 4 withholds financial
benefits from any person or organization that does so. 188
Petitions to the Supreme Court against the Boycott Law were submitted, and litigated before an extended nine-judge panel, which was split on
different issues relating to the law. The Court unanimously held that the
purpose of the Boycott Law, to protect the citizens of Israel from economic,
cultural or academic damages, is a legitimate purpose (i.e., that the struggle
against boycott is a legitimate and compelling governmental interest). It
further unanimously held that Section 2(c) of the Law, which originally
allowed for the imposition of punitive damages, without the need to prove
causation between the wrongful act (i.e. call for boycott) and actual damage, was a disproportionate and therefore an unconstitutional infringement
of the right of freedom of speech and declared it void. 189 Judge Melcer,
writing the principal majority opinion, held that "the unbridled 'punitive
damages' regime created by Section 2(c) of the Law exceeded the confines
of the 'proportionality zone,'" as the punitive damages carry "a 'chilling
effect' on political expressions and lively social discourse." 190 It was also
unanimously decided to deny the petitions in so far as they related to Sections 3 and 4 of the Law, due to lack of ripeness for adjudication, and
allowed for future petition against them, if and when the Minister of Finance would take action under these Sections.
The majority opinion, supported by five Judges, denied the petitions
relating to Sections 2(a) and 2(b) of the Law, which define the tortious
wrongdoing, against the dissenting opinions, delivered by four judges.
While all Judges agreed that the Boycott Law infringes freedom of speech,
they diverged as to whether a call to boycott lies at the core of protected
political speech, or somewhere closer to its margins, 191 and consequently
187. Id. at § 3.
188. Id. at § 4.
189. HCJ 5239/11 Uri Avnery et al v. The Knesset et al (Apr. 15, 2015), Nevo
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew). All citations are taken from the English
summary of the Avnery judgement, available at https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/

Home/Download?path=EnglishVerdicts\1 1\390\052\k21 &fileName=11052390.
K21&type=4 [Hereinafter: Avnery English Summary of Judgment].
190. Avnery English Summary of Judgment, supra note 189, at 6.
191. According to Judge Melcer's opinion, although a call to a political boycott is
a political speech, which usually enjoys the highest level of protection by the courts, it
also deviates from the "pure" freedom of speech. Avnery, para. 30 (Judge Melcer). He
also rejected the petitioners' claims that a call to boycott helps promote the marketplace
of ideas, as it wishes to change the political status quo by coercion achieved by economic means, and not by adhering to reason, and as such, a democratic state aimed at
promoting the marketplace of ideas will be more reluctant to protect boycotters' freedom of speech. Id. Deputy President Rubinstein concurred with Judge Melcer. Id. at
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also on the constitutionality of transforming such a call into a civil wrong
under the Boycott Law.
Some of the Judges recognized that at the heart of the petition was a
hotly debated political controversy, which is the Israeli policy towards the
West Bank, East Jerusalem and other territories in dispute, insinuated in the
Boycott Law by the words "an area under its [Israel's] control." As judge
Danziger noted, "the fate of the Area and the settlements located in it is a
matter of profound political and public disagreement in Israel" 192 and as
such, "those wishing to express their discontent with the government's policy regarding the Area and to call others to oppose that policy, are entitled
to the full protection granted in our constitutional regime for political expression." 193 Hence, as a boycott of this kind addresses an internal Israeli
political issue, it cannot be regarded as an expression of protest against the
existence of the State of Israel per se. Other judges, including from the
majority camp, agreed with the insight that the Boycott Law, by referring
not only to boycotting a person or an entity qua Israeli but also for her or its
ties to "an area" under Israel's control (i.e. settlements) touches upon the
exposed nerves of Israeli politics. 194

para. D (Deputy President Rubinstein). Judge Amit also joined Judge Melcer by holding
that calling to a boycott fails to promote other rationales of freedom of speech, which
are the driving out of falsity and the discovery of truth and the enhancement of the
democratic process. Id. at Para. 12, 21 (Judge Amit). Retired President Grunis and acting President Naor also concurred with Judge Melcer. Id. at para. 2 (Retired President
Grunis), para. 3 (President Naor). Unlike the majority opinions, Judge Danziger, whom
Judge Joubran joined, held that a call to a political boycott promotes the three underlying rationales of freedom of speech: promotion of the marketplace of ideas, the enhancement of the political discourse, and the expression of autonomy by the boycotter.
Id. at para. 26 (Judge Danziger), para. 1 (Judge Joubran). Judge Vogelman also held
that a call to boycott the Israeli settlements in the OPT is a clear political expression. Id.
at para 2 (Judge Vogelman).
192. Avnery English Summary of Judgement, supra note 189, at 7.

193. Id.
194. Judge Hendel stressed that the Law, in itself, will lead courts into meddling
with clear political policy. Avnery, para 9 (Judge Hendel). Deputy President Rubinstein,
while recognizing that the expertise of the courts in matters of political policy is limited,
also states that the State of Israel is facing boycotts caused by the BDS movement and
that the Law sets to address this issue - and aims at protecting the interests of Israeli
citizens who settled in the Area, backed by the support of the Israeli governments
throughout the years. Id. at para. YA (Deputy President Rubinstein). Retired President
Grunis also expressed concerns regarding the involvement of judges in political issues
such as the Israeli control over the Area, and emphasized that the legislator may defend
Israeli citizens' property and well-being by suppressing calls to boycotts. Id. at para. 4
(Retired President Grunis).
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This led Judge Danziger to interpret, alongside Judge Joubran, Section
1 of the Boycott Law, which sets the definition for the application of the
Law, to read that only a certain type of boycott crosses the threshold of the
Law - a complete boycott against the State of Israel as such. Hence, ruled
the two minority Judges, "a call to boycott an institution of the State or a
call to boycott areas which are under the control of the State, unless accompanied by a call for an overall boycott of the State, shall not come within
the ambit of the Law." 195 Judge Vogelman, dissenting separately, used the
"blue pencil" technique to simply delete the words "or area under its control" from the Boycott Law. 196 Judge Hendel, in his own dissenting opinion,
held that Section 2 should be annulled altogether. According to Judge
Hendel, the Section ". . . does not pass the constitutionality test and 'privatization' of the opportunity to protect the public interest by putting it in the
hands of the individual could create a significant chilling effect against political freedom of expression." 197
The majority judges, however, were satisfied with striking down the
punitive damages provision of the Boycott Law, and refused to declare the
labeling of a call for boycott as a civil wrong, in and of itself, unconstitutional. Yet, it should be added, so far no civil suit was filed against anyone
in Israel for perpetrating a tortious wrong under the Boycott Law. Striking
down the provision, which originally enabled to sue a person for boycott
support without the need to prove a nexus between such support and the
suffering of actual damages, has no doubt maid such legal proceedings almost impossible to win.
Apart from stipulating that boycott calls constitute a civil wrong, the
Israeli Government, in 2015, decided that the Ministry of Strategic Affairs
would be in charge of fighting the delegitimization of Israel in general and
the BDS movement in particular. 198 In August 2016, a joint team, headed by
the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Strategic Affairs, examined the
issue of refusing the admission of activists in the BDS movement into
Israel. 199 In March 2017, the Knesset passed Amendment 28 to the Entry
into Israel Law, which amended Article 2 of the law. 200 Following Amendment 28, Article 2(d) bars the issuance of a visa or a residency permit for
195. Avnery English Summary of Judgement, supra note 189, at 9.
196. Avnery, at para 9 (Judge Vogelman).
197. Avnery English Summary of Judgement, supra note 189, at 10.
198. Decision 511 of the 34th Government of Israel "Transferring of area of activity from the Prime Minister's Office to the Office of Strategic Affairs" (2.9.2015),

https://www.gov.il/he/departments/policies/2015_dec511.
199. Criteria for the Prevention of Entry to Israel of BDS Activists, https://www.
gov.il/he/Departments/Policies/bdsactivits_criteria_for_entering_israel.

200. Entry into Israel Law, 5712-1952, SH No. 111, p. 354.
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any foreigner who made a "public call for boycotting Israel," as defined in
the Boycott Law, or is affiliated with an organization that did so. 20 1 It is
important to note, that unlike in the Boycott Law, Amendment 28 does not
set a probability of harm criterion. Article 2(e) provides that the Minister of
Interior may issue a visa or a residency permit to a boycott supporter nonetheless "for special reasons", hence creating an interplay reminiscent of
Sections 1182(a)(27) and Section 1182(a)(28) of the aforementioned and
erstwhile, McCarran-Walter Act. 20 2
Shortly thereafter, the Population and Immigration Authority published a list of criteria for the application of the Amendment. 20 3 It states that
an organization which supports boycotts and promotes them in an active
and ongoing manner, rather than merely criticize Israeli policy, would be
regarded an organization which is publicly calling for the boycotting of
Israel, within the meaning of Amendment 28. The list also states how to
identify activists that affiliate with such organizations: serving as senior
executives in the organization; central activists (i.e. those who actively, substantially, and consistently promote boycotts, either within the organization
or independently); etc. Institutional actors, such as mayors, 2 04 who actively
and consistently promote boycotts are also on the list of criteria.
Since the enactment of the Amendment, several scholars and human
rights activists were denied entry into Israel. 205 It should be noted, however,
201. Id. at § 2(d).
202. Id. at § 2(e).
203. Criteria for the Prevention of Entry to Israel of BDS Activists, supra note

199.
204. See, e.g., Yanir Cozin, Despite Ban, Pro-BDS Dublin Mayor Enters Israel
after Name Gaffe, JERUSALEM POST (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Senior-BDS-activist-entered-Israel-after-Ministry-misspelled-name549451;Leyal Khalife, French Mayor Denied Entry by IsraeliAuthorities Because He's
a BDS Supporter, STEPFEED (Apr. 20, 2018), https://stepfeed.com/french-mayor-denied-entry-by-israeli-authorities-because-he-s-a-bds-supporter-8856.
Palestinian BDS
National Committee (BNC), Dozens of Spanish cities declaring themselves 'Free of
Israeli Apartheid', BDSMOVEMENT (Sept. 8, 2016), https://bdsmovement.net/news/dozens-spanish-cities-declaring-themselves-free-israeli-apartheid.
205. In July 2017, only 4 months after the legislation, 5 BDS activists were prevented from boarding their flight from Washington, D.C. to Israel. Upon boarding the
plane, the group was told that the Israeli government had ordered the airline not to let
them aboard. See: 5 BDS Activists Preventedfrom Boarding Flight to Israel, TIMES
ISRAEL (July 25, 2017), https://www.timesofisrael.com/bds-activists-prevented-fromboarding-flight-to-israel/. In May 2018, Katherine Franke and Vincent Warren, two
U.S. human rights activists (Franke being also a professor at Columbia Law School),
were detained for 14 hours upon arrival to Ben-Gurion Airport and were flown back to
New York afterwards. Israel accused the two, which were invited to lead a delegation of
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that although it seems that Amendment 28 caused an inflation of ideological
exclusions and deportations, similar actions were carried out prior to its
enactment as well. 20 6 In these previous instances, the Minister of Interior
simply invoked his general authority - embedded in Article 11 to the En-

15 fellow human rights activists touring Israel and the West Bank, of being involved in
the BDS movement. See: Dina Kraft, Two Leading U.S. Human Rights Activists Refused Entry to Israel, One for BDS Ties, HAARETZ (May 3, 2018), https://
www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-two-leading-u-s-human-rights-activists-de-

ported-from-israel-1.6052515. In the beginning of July 2018, Ariel Gold, a Jewish proPalestinian activist and an affiliate of the NGO Code Pink, was barred from entering
Israel. Gold, who came on a visa to take part in a Jewish studies program at the Hebrew
University in Jerusalem, was deported after the Minister of Strategic Affairs requested
the Minister of Interior to have her visa canceled. See: ProminentJewish BDS Activist
Denied Entry to Israel, TIMES ISRAEL (July 2, 2018), https://www.timesofisrael.com/
prominent-jewish-bds-activist-denied-entry-to-israel/. A month later, Jewish-American
journalist Peter Beinart was withheld at the airport, where he was questioned about his
association with various Israeli NGOs and about his past participation in a demonstration in Hebron in support of Palestinians rights. See: Amir Tibon & Noa Landau,
Israel'sShin Bet Detains Peter Beinartat Ben-Gurion Airport Over PoliticalActivity,
HAHRETZ (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-beinart-iwas-detained-at-ben-gurion-airport-over-political-activity-1.6381149. Unlike the previous describe incidents, however, Beinart was finally allowed in. Israeli Prime Minister
Netanyahu later responded that the Beinart withholding and questioning was "an administrative mistake". See: Amir Tibon & Noa Landau, Israel's Shin Bet Detains Peter

Beinart at Ben-Gurion Airport Over Political Activity, HAHRETZ (Aug. 13, 2018),
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-beinart-i-was-detained-at-ben-gurionairport-over-political-activity-1.6381149. There might, of course, be other similar instances, unknown for lack of media coverage The Association for Civil Rights in Israel
(ACRI) issued a letter to the Ministry of Justice, claiming that the airport detentions
made by the Shin Bet are intimidating and having a chilling effect on the right to freedom of speech. Deputy Attorney General Dina Zilber responded by saying that the
detentions are within the Shin Bet authority, but that the protocols for the execution of
this authority will undergo "refresh," as "some Shin Bet and border officials behaved in
ways that did not conform to the legal and policy restrictions." Shin Bet Will no Longer

Ask Would-Be Entrants to Israel about Their Politics, TIMES ISRAEL (Setp. 28, 2018),
https://www.timesofisrael.com/shin-bet-wont-ask-about-political-views-at-the-bordertop-official-says/. For the full correspondence between ACRI and the DOJ, see Detention of Activists in Airports, ACRI (Jul. 31, 2018), https://law.acri.org.il/he/42741.
206. This was acknowledged by the State in its answer to the petitions mentioned
above: Para 28 to State's answer to petition made in HCJ 3965/17 Alon Harel (Prof) et
al. v. The Knesset et al. (Feb. 2, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in
Hebrew).
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to revoke any visa or permit previously issued under

the Law. 207

Amendment 28 has already generated several legal proceedings regarding its constitutionality or the legality of its application. Two months
after its enactment, a petition challenging its constitutionality was filed
before the Supreme Court. 2 0 The petitioners, two professors from the He-

brew University of Jerusalem, claimed that the Amendment has an adverse
effect on them as members of the Israeli academia, for their lack of ability
to organize conferences and round tables without any certainty if the invited
foreign speakers may enter Israel. As such, the Amendment violates their
freedom of occupation, as well as their freedom of speech and that of other
Israeli citizens, wishing to be exposed to criticism on Israel's policy.
The Supreme Court held one and only oral hearing of the petition.
Judge Vogeleman stressed, alongside Judges Melcer and Barak-Erez, that
given the ruling in Mandel, it is problematic for the petitioners, who referred to the case, to rely on it. 209 The judges advised the petitioners to
withdraw their petition, whilst not barring the petitioners from re-submitting a revised petition. The petition was withdrawn, and then re-submitted. 210 However, the second petition was also dismissed following an oral
207. For example, in 2008, Jewish American academic Norman Finkelstein was
deported from Israel and banned from re-entry for 10 years, due to expression of solidarity with Hizbullah, a Lebanese Islamic militia: Toni O'Loughlin, US Academic Deported and Bannedfor CriticisingIsrael, GUARDIAN (May 26, 2008), https://www.the
guardian.com/world/2008/may/26/israelandthepalestinians.usa. Two years later, the renowned scholar Professor Noam Chomsky was denied entry into Israel and the West
Bank, after being invited to speak at Bir Zeit University in the West Bank. Chomsky
claimed that the Ministry of Interior ....
apparently didn't like the fact that I was due
to lecture at a Palestinian university and not in Israel." (Amira Hass, Noam Chomsky
Denied Entry into Israel and West Bank, HAARETZ (May 16, 2010), https://
www.haaretz.com/1.5121279.) In 2016, Israel refused to issue a visa for Isabel Phiri, an
assistant general secretary with the World Council of Churches in Geneva, for her alleged activism in the BDS movement. File No. 3084-18 Court of Appeals of The Entry
into Israel Law, 1952, Phiri v. Population and ImmigrationAuthority (Oct. 17, 2018),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (holding that a border service officer's decision to deny entry to Phiri, before the enactment of Amendment 28, due to
concern that Phiri will illegally emigrate to Israel, was unreasonable and that the Population and Immigration Authority must provide explanations for its decision to exclude
Phiri from Israel).

208. HCJ 3965/17 Alon Harel (Prof.) et al. v. The Knesset et al. (Feb. 2, 2018),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew).

209. P. 3-4 to protocol of discussion held at Feb. 2, 2018 in HCJ 3965/17 Alon
Harel (in Hebrew) (on file with author).

210. HCJ 5029/18 Alon Harel (Prof.) et al. v. The Knesset et al.
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hearing, in which the judges were again unfavorable to the petition. No
written reasoning was offered by the Court.
The Amendment was also litigated in concrete individual cases, in
which the interpretation and application of it (rather than its constitutionality) were discussed.21 The most important of which is that of Lara Al-

211. One of them is the case of Omar Shakir. On May 2018, the Minister of
Interior refused to renew a one year B/1 working permit, previously given to Shakir, an
American citizen working in Israel since 2017 on behalf of Humans Rights Watch
(HRW). The decision followed extensive research done by the Ministry of Strategic
Affairs regarding different statements made by Shakir, from the time he was a student
in the United States (and was the co-President of "Students for Palestinian Human
Rights," a Stanford student body that called for economic boycott of Israel) and up until
the time he was working in Israel (during which he tried to attend a FIFA meeting in
Bahrain, in order to put pressure, as he admitted in a tweet, to boycott Israeli soccer
clubs operating from Israeli settlements in the OPT). (For the report of the Ministry of
Strategic Affairs dated 12 July 2017, in Hebrew, see: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/
files/supporting-resources/ministry-strategic_affairsdossier_hebrew.pdf).
In March
2018 the Ministry of Strategic Affairs issued an updated report on Shakir, repeating
most of the findings of the previous report with one major difference: it now acknowledged that since his arrival to Israel, Shakir made no public call to boycott Israel, albeit
"he continues to encourage activity in this area [boycott on Israel] indirectly through
expression in his Twitter account" (Section 4 to a report by the Ministry of Strategic
Affairs and Public Diplomacy, dated 28 March 2018; annex B to the State's response of
21 June 2018 (copy with author)). Despite this difference, the recommendation of the
Ministry of Strategic affairs, not to renew Shakir's visa, remained, as did the decision of
the Minister of Interior. HRW and Shakir petitioned against the Minister of Interior to
the Administrative Court of Jerusalem (File No. 36759-05-18 AdminA (Jer), Human
Rights Watch v. Minister of Interior (Apr. 16, 2019), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew). They argued, among other things that deporting an alien, or not
allowing her in, because of her support of boycott is a disproportionate infringement on
freedom of speech, and hence unconstitutional. The petition was denied. The Administrative Court ruled that Shakir, who refused to declare before the Court that he would
not call for a boycott against Israel while he is in the Country (unlike Alqasm, who
agreed to do so) failed to convince the Court that he neglected his past support of
boycotting Israel. An appeal to the Supreme Court was denied (Admin. App. 2966/19
Human Rights Watch v. Minister of Interior(Nov. 5, 2019), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew). The Supreme Court agreed with the lower Court's reasoning
and refused to discuss the constitutionality of Amendment 28 for procedural reasons.
The Court rejected Shakir's argument, that a call for boycott supported by a claim that
Israeli activities in the occupies territories are violations on international law, is outside
the ambit of Amendment 28. It further held, that Shakir lacked standing to raise an
argument regarding the infringement of freedom of speech of Israelis resulting from his
deportation. A request for rehearing in an extended panel was denied (F.H.Admin.
7697/19 Human Rights Watch v. Minister of Interior (Jan. 20, 2020), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew).
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qasem. The Israeli consulate in Miami issued Alqasem, a 22-year-old
American citizen, a one-year student visa, after she was admitted to a
Master's program in Human Rights and Transitional Justice at the Faculty
of Law of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. However, upon arrival to
Ben Gurion airport, Alqasem was denied entry, based on Amendment 28, as
the Ministry of Strategic Affairs found evidence that she was a member,
and later on the president of "Students for Justice in Palestine" (SJP) while
she was a college student in the University of Florida. The small union,
consisting of less than ten students, was affiliated - so claimed the Ministry - with National Students for Justice in Palestine (NSJP), which is on
the Ministry's "blacklist" as a supporter of boycotting Israel.
Alqasem appealed to the Appellate Immigration Tribunal 212 and argued that she was unaffiliated with SJP for over a year, and does not support boycotting of Israel any longer, hence willing to study in an Israeli
university. She declared before the Tribunal that she would not engage in
any boycott activities while in Israel. Her lawyers presented a letter from
the Rector of the Hebrew University, supporting her appeal. In that letter,
the University mainly introduced utilitarian concerns, such as that the entry
ban would adversely affect the great effort of Israeli academia, with the
support and funding of the Israeli government, to build international ties
with other universities worldwide; and that the entry ban would serve as
double-edge sword, as it would only fuel BDS rhetoric against Israel instead of portraying Israel as a "democratic, enlightened and egalitarian
state." Despite all of this, the appeal was dismissed, based on the Tribunal's
ruling that the Executive's decision was within the bounds of
reasonableness.
Alqasem then appealed to the Tel Aviv Administrative Court. At that
point, the Hebrew University requested, and was granted permission, to join
the appeal. In its short submission, the University basically made the same
arguments as its Rector did in his aforementioned letter. The Administrative
Court rejected the appeal. It mentioned the notion of SEP and added that
"there is a significant concern that the appellant would use her stay in Israel
to promote pleas for boycotting Israel." 213 Regarding the Hebrew University's stand, the Court ruled that despite the importance to encourage student exchange programs and academic collaborations between Israeli
universities and their counterparts abroad, endeavors that might indeed be
212. File No. 5604-18 Court of Appeals of The Entry into Israel Law (TA) Alqasem v. Ministry of Interior (Oct. 4, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in
Hebrew).

213. File No. 11002-10-18 AdminA (TA) Alqasem v. Ministry of Interior(Oct. 12,
2018), at para. 15 Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew).
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jeopardized by the decision to ban Alqasem's entry after she already obtained a student visa, the Executive's decision is within bounds of
reasonableness.
A three judge panel of Supreme Court overturned the Administrative
Court's decision, and allowed Alqasem into the country. At this point, for
the first time, the Hebrew University introduced an argument which expressed the importance of the exchange of ideas with students such as Alqasem. It wrote in its submission:
Respondent 2, as an institution of higher education of the front
line, wishes to stress, that the university is a place of an exchange of
ideas, earning and creating knowledge. It is a place which is not
afraid of disagreements and celebrates plurality of voices. The University believes that academia grows and develops out of free exchange of ideas, listening, discourse and dialogue. 214

-

Judge Hendel, who wrote the leading opinion and was joined by Judge
Vogelman, stressed that Alqasem's lawyers never questioned the constitutionality of Amendment 28, a matter pending at the time before the Supreme Court. Hence, the decision dealt with the interpretation of
Amendment 28 and its application on Alqasem, rather than its validity. He
ruled, while relying on the concept of "defensive democracy" and quoting
MKs deliberation during the Knesset legislation proceedings, that the
Amendment's purpose is preventive rather than punitive. Hence, since Alqasem was not engaged in BDS activities for at least a year and a half,
vowed not to advocate it while in Israel and is interested in joining an Israeli university (which is the opposite of boycotting Israeli academia)
the decision not to allow her in was not within the scope of Article 28, and
was, furthermore, unreasonable. 215 He added that the decision is also incongruent with the MOI's own internal regulations, which provide that Amendment 28 would be invoked only against foreigners who advocate boycott
against Israel in an "active, consistent and ongoing manner." While indicating in passing that one of the University's argument against the Executive's

214. Respondent No. 2 Response in AdminA 7216/18 Alqasem v. Immigration
and PopulationAuthority, para. 11 (Oct. 16, 2018), (on file with author; author's translation) [hereinafter University Argument].
215. AdminA 7216/18 Alqasem v. Immigration and Population Authority, 15
(Oct. 18, 2018), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew). It seems that the
Court could not suffice itself by saying that the decision was given outside the scope of
Amendment 28 and therefore without authority (ultra vires), as the State argued before
the court that the Minister of Interior holds a broad general authority to refuse entry of
non-Israelis, which Amendment 28 did not narrow down. Hence, the Court added that
the decision was not only absent Amendment 28 authority, but also unreasonable.
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decision was that "academically, there is much utility in diversity and multitude of ideas generated by inclusion of students of different cultural, linguistic and national background to the classrooms," 2 1 6 Judge Hendel did not
base his decision on free speech grounds. As a matter of fact he stressed,
that "invalidating the [Minister of Interior's] current decision does not imply giving [Algasem] a carte blanche - since, if she goes astray again and
usurps her stay in Israel to promote boycott activity, the Minister would be
able to revoke her license [to stay] at once and deport her from the
country."

217

Judge Baron agreed, in her concurring opinion, with the interpretive
move of Judge Hendel, which excludes past BDS supporters, who repudiated from it, from the scope of Amendment 28. She is the only panel member, however, who also mentioned free speech concerns. She wrote:
Freedom of speech is the livelihood of democracy. When a person's right to free speech is violated, due to Article 2(d) of the law,
even if it is someone who is not an Israeli citizen or resident, an
arrow also hits the heart of Israeli society as a democratic society.
Freedom of speech is a condition for live and free marketplace of
ideas and opinions, for public debate on significant matters and for
the elucidation of stands and ideologies. In the context of the boycott
phenomenon, freedom of speech violation inhibits the possibility to
deal with ideas which we as a society wish to refute - and this, of
8
course, is not what we wish for. 21

She then goes on to say:
As [Algasem's] acts are not sufficient grounds for refusing her
entry to Israel, the unavoidable impression is that revoking her visa is
due to the political opinions she holds. If this is indeed the case, this
is an extreme and dangerous step, which might lead to the dissolution
of the pillars on which Israel's democracy stands. 219

Following the Supreme Court ruling, Alqasem was released from her
several weeks long immigration detention and was able to join her fellow
students at the faculty of law of the Hebrew University.

216. This argument concerning diversity among students is mentioned neither in
the University's written submission to the Court, nor in the transcript of the oral hearing
before the Court. It could have either been raised orally by the University's lawyer yet
not transcribed, or is Judge's Hendel's own expansion of the University's written argument cited above. University submission, supra note 214.

217. Id. at para. 18.
218. Alqasem, at 17 (author's translation).
219. Id. at 18-19. (author's translation; emphasis in origin).
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The Hebrew University's joining of the proceedings, I would argue,
had a great potential to take the Alqasem case to the constitutional sphere
where it belongs. Unfortunately, the University decided - maybe strategically - to emphasize utilitarian concerns such as keeping the prestige of
Israeli academia and avoiding a scenario in which the denial of entry "backfires" and fuels anti-Israel activism. As observed above, only in its submission to the Supreme Court did the University, for the first time, argue that
the denial of Alqasem's entry would be detrimental to the vigilant academic
and political debate within Israel campuses. 220 Accordingly, the majority
opinion of Judges Hendel and Vogelman hardly mentioned freedom of
speech concerns. Like in the 2018 Bereaved Families case, they focused
instead on interpretation based on the legislature's original intent, and administrative law concerns such as the agency's abidance by its own internal
regulations.
Even Judge Baron, despite her attention to freedom of speech concerns, did not apply strict scrutiny while reviewing the decision to disallow
Alqasem into the country. Just like her colleagues, she based her decision
on grounds of unreasonableness of violation of internal regulations. She
too, like her colleagues, clarified that Alqasem is not to break her promise
not to advocate boycott while in Israel lest she would be justifiably
deported.
As a result, while the Alqasem precedent is a positive development, in
that it limits the government's power to invoke Amendment 28 to "preventive" purposes only, it does not provide the fullest possible protection to
freedom of speech, as it could and should have. I will therefore offer an
alternative interpretation of Article 28, which is in line with the Avnery
case, 22 1 yet more protective of freedom of speech.
220. Compare this seemingly hesitance to raise freedom of speech concerns by the
Hebrew University with arguments raised by universities in Mandel, supra note 44 at
760 ("plaintiffs claim that the statutes prevent them from hearing and meeting with
Mandel in person for discussions, in contravention of the First Amendment.")
221. I disagree with the Avnery ruling, and support the minority opinion of Judge
Hendel, according to which article 2 of the Boycott Law - which stipulates that a boycott against Israel constitutes a civil wrong - is an unconstitutional infringement on
freedom of speech. Interestingly enough, two American District Courts ruled in this
vein when they considered (in preliminary proceedings) Kansas and Arizona statutes,
which required all persons who enter into a contract with these respective states to
certify that they are not engaged in a boycott of Israel (Koonts v. Watson, 283 F. Supp.

3d. 1007 (2018); Jordahl v. Brnovich, 336 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (2018)). Despite my support of the minority opinion in Avnery, I take the majority opinion as a baseline for my
interpretive thesis of Amendment 28. I do so for doctrinal-pragmatic reasons, as the
chances that this expanded panel's ruling will be overturned or mitigated seem extremely low. This was evident in the Supreme Court decision in Alqasem, in which even
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The Avnery case, no doubt, complicates any constitutional challenge of
Amendment 28. As described above, the Court ruled there, that the Boycott
Law's principal provision, which makes a calling for a boycott, of a person
or entity due to their ties to Israel or an area within its control, a civil
wrong, is constitutional. The difficulty then is, that if - as the Supreme
Court ruled - a call for boycott, including boycott of businesses in the
settlements, could be a legal wrong to be compensated for, how can Israelis
argue that they want to exercise their right to engage in conversation with
aliens who call for boycotting Israel or the settlements (i.e. perpetrate a
legal wrong)? This difficulty is exacerbated as, according to the majority
opinion in Avnery, a call for boycott is entitled to a limited protection as
compared to other "regular" political expressions.
Nevertheless, the matter is more nuanced than that. The Boycott Law
specifically dictates, that for a call for boycott to be compensable, there
must be "a reasonable probability that the call would lead to boycott."
Moreover, the Supreme Court struck down the punitive damages provision
in the original law and ruled that an individual who called for boycott could
be held accountable in civil law, only insofar as another individual incurred
some real damage by that call. In other words, for a call for boycott to be a
basis for compensation, not only the content of the call and the circumstances that surrounded it must be such as to make it reasonably probable
that it would lead to a boycott, but an actual boycott has to occur, and actual
damages must be incurred.
Amendment 28 does not include any of these elements. It simply states
that a non-Israeli who publicly called for a boycott of Israel or the settlement (and - the Alqasem decision adds - did not repudiate it) or is affiliated with an organization that made such a call - is banned from entering
Israel. The fact that the call was not materialized in any manner or that there
is low probability that it would - is supposedly immaterial for the decision
to allow that person in, regardless of the fact that some Israelis might wish
to engage in a dialogue with her, for example. Could judicial interpretation
insert such elements into Amendment 28? For the sake of freedom of
speech, and let us recall, that all nine judges of the Avnery Court agreed that
a call for boycott is a political speech entitled for protection, despite their
ancillary differences on the scope of protection, 222 I believe it could, and
should. Alternatively, these elements should be inserted by the Court, by
using the "reading-in" technique. If my argumentation to employ these two
legal methods (interpretation and reading in) fails, I will alternatively argue
Judges Hendel and Vogelman, who dissented in Avnery, declined to reconsider the
Avnery ruling.

222. Supra note 191.
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that a refusal by the Minister to employ her article 2(e) waiver authority
along the suggested lines should be deemed unlawful, for not giving the
proper normative weight to freedom of speech considerations. If that proposition fails too, I will argue that Amendment 28 should be struck down as
an unconstitutional violation of freedom of speech. Here is my explanation.
Take for example an alien, a professor of philosophy, who once publicly called to boycott products manufactured by Israeli factories located in
the OPT, and still holds that position. She is invited to give a lecture in a
symposium to be held by an Israeli institution on "the philosophical underpinnings of boycott." Philosophizing on boycott does not necessarily entail
supporting boycott and is definitely not calling for boycott, and hence
none of the conference participants would necessarily be involved in perpetrating a wrong in torts, according to the Boycott Law. Or, to make things
even simpler, let's assume that the professor is invited to give a lecture on
Spinoza's philosophical heritage. The audience's wish to hear the lecture of
the invited professor is undoubtedly protected under its members' right to
free speech. Hence, Amendment 28 - which supposedly bars the entry of
an alien simply because she publicly advocates boycotting Israel or the settlements, notwithstanding if she intends to make such a call upon entry to
Israel, and the probability that such a call - even if she made it - would
lead to actual boycott and damages - is prima facie unconstitutional, due
to the Israeli "listeners" rights and possibly due to the prohibition on governmental "viewpoint discrimination."
A possible way to deal with this constitutional transgression is to interpret the words "a public call to boycott the State of Israel, as defined in the
Law to Prevent Injury of the State of Israel by Boycott, 2011 [the Boycott
Law]," as referring not only to the definition of "boycott of the State of
Israel" in Section 1 of the Boycott Law, but also to the additional elements
of the tortious wrong, stipulated in Section 2 of the Boycott law (reasonable
probability to cause boycott). 223 By utilizing this interpretation, the infringe223. I find the elements of Section 2 of the Boycott Law are more relevant than
the elements of Sections 3 and 4 of that law, dealing with withdrawal of economic
benefits to persons or entities who support boycotting Israel, as Section 2 more directly
deals with the constitutional right to free speech, and that is the matter of my attention
in this article. Unlike Section 2, Section 3 and 4 of the Boycott Law don't mandate that
a call for a boycott has to carry a reasonable probability to cause one for their execution.
In Avnery, it was unanimously decided to deny the petitions in so far as they related to
Sections 3 and 4 of the Law, due to lack of ripeness for adjudication, and allowed for
future petition against them, pursuant to a concrete decision by the Minister of Finance.
It is important to note that as the Alqasem Court held that Amendment 28 is not punitive
in its nature but preventive, it should be inferred that it cannot be construed in accordance with Section 3 and 4 of the Boycott Law, which are clearly punitive.
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ment of the freedom speech of Israeli "would-be listeners," who bona fide
wish to listen to aliens who support a boycott on Israel or the settlements, is
minimized.
If the Court, that might be asked in the future to adopt this interpretation would rule - against my opinion - that it does not have the power to
reach this result by way of interpretation, then I think it would have to reach
it by using the "reading in" technique, which it has used in the past. 2 24 This
relatively modest reading-in would bring it to the bare minimum necessary
to meet the level of proportionality that could justify infringement on freedom of speech, while taking the Avnery ruling - i.e. that preventing boycott against Israel or the settlements is a "compelling governmental
interest" - as prevailing. The Israeli legislature decided, after all, in the
Boycott Law (Amendment 28's "eldest brother" as per Judge Vogelman's
labeling in Alqasem), that only a call for a boycott, that carried a reasonable
probability for actual boycott to happen, could be considered a legal wrong.
If this is the legal standard that the Court found fit for "talkers" who engage
in boycott discourse, there is no reason why the same standard would not
apply to "listeners" as well: an Israeli should be entitled to listen to a foreigner who once called for a boycott, and even to a foreigner still calling for
boycott, as long as this call does not carry any reasonable probability for
actual boycott. After all, even when the "compelling governmental interest"
is national security, only near certainty to grave and substantial harm justifies, according to Israeli jurisprudence, impeding speech. 225 Surely, the
"danger" of boycott cannot be considered more compelling than the danger
of revealing classified military information.
Such an interpretation or, alternatively, "reading in" Amendment 28 is
especially warranted, as banning a speaker from entering the country is a
pervasive encroachment on freedom of speech of the Israeli bona fide listeners, in the form of "prior restraint." According to the long-standing Israeli jurisprudence 226 (reaffirmed in the Avnery case 22 7), as well as
224. The Supreme Court of Israel is yet to fully flesh out the "reading in" doctrine
and the circumstances in which it would be inclined to use it; but it did implement it,
and gave some general guidelines as to its scope in Israeli constitutional law. See: HCJ
8300/02 Nasser et al v. The Israeli Government et al, para. 57-60 of President (ret.)

Bieinisch's opinion (May 22, 2012), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in
Hebrew).

225. See, e.g., HCJ 680/88 Schnitzer v. The Chief Military Censor, 42(4) PD 617
(1989).
226. CA 214/89 Avnery v. Shapiro, 43(3) 840 (1989).
227. Judge Melcer, in para. 56(b) acknowledged that a court could issue an injunction to prevent a future call for boycotting Israel or the settlements, if there is a suspicion that an individual is about to make such an expression, based on the Boycott Law.
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American jurisprudence, 228 this is the most severe form of violation of free
speech, and therefore could be deemed constitutional only in rare cases, in
which the governmental interest in particularly compelling.
True, as the State responded in the principled petition against the
Amendment, 229 it could be difficult and cumbersome for a border control
clerk to assess whether a person who called for boycott of Israel or the
settlements in the past will refrain from doing so in her upcoming visit to
Israel - as she might promised - or if past, present or future boycott calls
of that person would lead to actual boycott by anyone and how many.
Hence, it is reasonable to argue that the primary burden to establish that this
would not be the case, lies on the alien herself and the citizens wishing to
hear her. However, an absolute refusal to allow a boycott advocate to enter
Israel would be outside the scope of Amendment 28, and an unconstitutional violation of the right of freedom of speech.
Even if my suggested interpretation as well "reading-in" argument are
both rejected, aliens, who are refused entry or continued stay based on Article 2(d), could invoke Article 2(e) of the Entry to Israel Law. This article,
as mentioned above, authorizes the Minister of Interior to grant an alien a
permission to enter Israel or sojourn in it, for special reasons, notwithstanding Article 2(d). The court could "inject" freedom of speech considerations
while reviewing the Minister's exercise of discretion under Article 2(e), just
as the American Court did while reviewing the Attorney General's refusal
to grant a waiver under Section 1182(a)(28) of the McCarran-Walter Act,
when it was still in force. I would, however, advise that the Israeli Supreme
Court use, while reviewing a case in which the Minister refused to employ
Article 2(e), and unlike its American counterpart, the ordinary standard of
review in free speech cases, i.e. strict scrutiny. As Gerald Nueman wrote, in
the American context:
The notion that resident aliens can be deported for constitutionally protected speech is an atavism in American law. Only the perception of deportation as the withdrawal of a privilege isolated from
constitutional values has enabled this practice to continue. . . the
proper perception of deportation as subject to First Amendment side
constraints requires that deportation grounds be evaluated by the nor-

He noted, however, that this worry is farfetched, as Israeli Courts are particularly hesitant to issue injunctions on future expressions, based on Supreme Court jurisprudence
on freedom of speech.

228. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
229. See Section 45 to the State's preliminary response in HCJ 3965/17, supra
note 208, dated Oct. 11, 2017 (on file with author).
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mal constitutional standard, which will not permit deportation for
speech for which the alien could not have been punished. 23 0

The same is true of a refusal of entry, as long as an Israeli is raising her
own right to engage in a conversation with the alien, who wishes to enter
the country.
If all other suggested legal means fail, then Amendment 28 should be
deemed unconstitutional. First, it is not even clear if the Amendment would
survive a "rational basis" scrutiny. 231 Even if it did, it would not survive
strict scrutiny. It is not convincing to argue that a predictably futile call for
boycott is alarming enough to justify curtailing one's freedom to convey it,
and another's freedom to listen to it.
The Alqasem ruling is not protective enough of freedom of expression,
as it conditions an alien's entry to Israel, and her continued stay in it, on not
calling for a boycott of Israel or its settlements whatsoever. My suggestion
is more protective of freedom of speech, as it provides that even if Alqasem
returns to vocally support boycott, and tries to convince others to do so, she
would not be deported if there is no reasonable probability that her call
would cause actual boycott. It is, indeed, ironical that freedom of speech
protection would be given to a speech so long as it is not perceived by the
decision-maker and the Court as persuasive or powerful enough, yet this is
an unfortunate outcome caused by the Avnery ruling. The suggested legal
analysis would at least somewhat expand the marketplace of ideas. This is a
good in itself, and might also potentially enable gradual, down-the-road
change.
CONCLUSION

In the era of globalization, information easily flows among countries.
Persons could also potentially move across borders, by advanced transportation, with little difficulty and many of them actually do. While most of us
could read about the opinions of people from other countries on the web,
there is still a unique effect to face-to-face interactions. Banning a foreigner
from entering a country because of her political opinion, or deporting her
for that reason, might not only adversely affect the foreigner's opportunity
to express herself, but also infringe on the citizens' right to be exposed to
different political ideas. Hence, ideological exclusion of foreigners is not
merely a matter of immigration policy. It is, first and foremost, a matter of

230. NEUMAN, supra note 2, at

109.

231. One might argue that no rational basis exists, as the non-Israeli boycott supporter could continue advancing that cause while out of Israel.
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constitutional law and human rights; and as such - should be subject to
strict judicial scrutiny.
The history of ideological bans in U.S. immigration law should serve
as a warning sign to Israeli policy-makers, judges and laypersons. It is not a
coincidence that such bans were most broadly employed in the U.S. during
the McCarthy era, when freedom of speech was most under attack. Israeli
protectors of democracy should keep an open eye and do whatever they can
to ensure that immigratory ideological bans would not lead to silencing critical or unpopular views, and the suppression of Israeli democracy itself.

